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3
The future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was up in the air at the end
of the Cold War. As an alliance formed to provide collective defense against the Soviet Union
and the Warsaw Pact, NATO needed to define a new mission in order to continue as a
meaningful actor in international politics. The prerogatives of the United States, as the main
military muscle behind NATO, were particularly crucial. Yet there was uncertainty as to whether
the U.S. would continue to guarantee security even to existing alliance members, let alone
whether NATO would provide a security umbrella to new members.1
Nearly two decades later, by 2008, NATO had grown by ten members. NATO enlarged
to include three new members in 1997, and again in 2002 to include seven more. Article 5 of the
North Atlantic Treaty now bounds the United States to come to the defense of former Warsaw
Pact and former Soviet republics. The scope of NATO-protected territory has approached
Russian borders. Not a bystander to this process, the U.S. has rather led the charge to enlarge
from within NATO. The major question of this study, then, is why the U.S. extended security
guarantees to new members and consistently pushed for NATO enlargement under the last three
presidential administrations. To answer the question, I will test three types of theoretical
perspectives – international relations, U.S. strategy, and republican security theory – against my
own empirical history of U.S. policy on NATO enlargement. I will compare the enlargement
predictions offered by these different perspectives with the motivations of U.S. policymakers.
The paper starts with a discussion of the different theoretical perspectives I will use, and
their predictions for enlargement. Theories in international relations aim to describe the general
behavior of all states. The constructivist perspective in particular offers guidance on enlargement
policy, and will be the only IR theory that is sufficiently consistent with the broad outlines of the
1

See, for example, John Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War,” The Atlantic
Monthly, Vol. 266, No. 2 (August 1990), pp 35-50.
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history to merit closer analysis in the empirical section. Competing perspectives on U.S. strategy
aim to describe the specific foreign policy behavior of the United States, using detailed
examinations of domestic coalitions. From this camp, the cooperative security perspective and
the primacy perspective each predict NATO enlargement, and thus are explored within my own
account of enlargement. Finally, the republican-security perspective aims to describe the security
behavior of republican governments. I will argue that this last perspective offers the best
explanation for U.S. support for NATO enlargement.
Following the theoretical discussion, I turn to my own account of the U.S. push for
NATO enlargement. I detail how the theoretical concepts of republican security theory fit in with
the empirical history of enlargement. I argue that policymaker statements used republican
security concepts in justifying enlargement, and that U.S. policies strived to achieve objectives
central to republican security theory. In detailing the history of NATO enlargement from an
American perspective, I show how these patterns have spanned three Presidents since the Cold
War, and answer why there has been continuous support for NATO enlargement from three, in
many ways very different, administrations.
The next section introduces the theoretical perspectives I will use in my examination of
U.S. support for NATO enlargement.

I. Theoretical Perspectives
International Relations
The major theories of international relations are used to explain and predict the general
behavior of states in the international system, including behavior regarding interstate alliances.

5
Here I will briefly outline three dominant theories – neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and
constructivism – and what each theory predicts about U.S. support for NATO enlargement.
Neorealism posits a system of competitive states in anarchy, where each state seeks to
survive and grow its relative power. The structural condition of anarchy acts as the largest
constraint on state behavior, demanding a self-preservation policy.2 For these reasons, neorealists
expect cooperation between states to be very rare and very hard to achieve. Competition for
relative power gains crowds out cooperation. Alliances will only form when an external, third
party threat outweighs the risks of cooperation, which include worries about relative gains, lack
of autonomy and lack of trust.3
The downfall of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact looked like the end of NATO to
many neorealists.4 The lack of a major threat meant either the dissolution of NATO or, at best,
maintenance of the status quo in terms of membership. Considering the high relative gains that a
country like Poland or Estonia receives when NATO guarantees its security, and the possibility
that enlargement could mean more confrontation with Russia without offsetting benefits, realists
would have a hard time arguing that their theory offers the most explanatory perspective on the
U.S. preference for NATO enlargement. Though I will rule out neorealism as an adequate theory
for explaining the policy, and do not test its main theoretical concepts later in my take on the
history of enlargement, there is one specific realist response that deserves attention. That realist
argument sees NATO enlargement as a means towards power gains relative to Russia, expanding

2

See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1979)
3
For a realist take on alliances, see John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International
Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49.
4
Lars Skalnes, “From the Outside In, From the Inside Out: NATO Expansion and International
Relations Theory,” Security Studies, 7, no. 4 (Summer 1998), 61. Also Mearsheimer, “Miss the
Cold War” (1990).
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NATO from Western Europe all the way up to Russian borders in an attempt to take over the old
Soviet “sphere of influence.” I will later argue that this take on NATO enlargement does not
adequately account for all of the other security motivations driving U.S. support.
Multiple studies that have pointed out neorealism’s difficulties in accounting for NATO
enlargement also provide a more hopeful, but ultimately unsatisfying answer on whether a
neoliberal institutionalist perspective helps explain U.S. policy to expand NATO.5 Though
neoliberal institutionalism is certainly not contradicted by NATO’s persistence and enlargement,
these studies show it does little in offering a specific answer for why it happened.
Neoliberal institutionalism focuses on the “complex interdependence” and potential for
cooperation among states, as a response to the dire forecast of neorealists.6 According to this
theory, states worry more about maximizing their absolute gains rather than relative gains, and
thus see more potential that realists would predict for international cooperation via institutions.
Rather than the realist focus on balance of power, neoliberals argue states hold a “balance of
interests” without a specific hierarchy. When states share areas of common interest, neoliberal
institutionalists expect states to compromise and cooperate through institutions, in order to reap
gains that would be unavailable without cooperation.
In his discussion of neoliberal institutionalism’s views on relations after the Cold War,
Robert Keohane argues that the theory would expect “NATO to use its organizational resources

5

See Skalnes (1998), Frank Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist
Explanation, Security Studies, 8, no. 2-3 (Winter 1998), pp. 198-234, and Gunter Hellmann and
Reinhard Wolf, “Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO,” Security
Studies, 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1993), pp. 3-43.
6
For example, see Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1984).
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to persist, by changing its tasks.”7 There is no reason why the defeat of the Soviet Union would
prevent Western institutions from continuing to provide states with opportunities for mutual
absolute gains.8 NATO’s persistence, as well as its enlargement, does not contradict the theory
to any degree. But as a systemic theory of international relations, neoliberal institutionalism does
not seek to describe any particular conception of state interests. Without a prediction of these
interests, there can be no real explanation for their evolution, and thus while NATO’s
continuation fits with neoliberal institutionalism the theory can only predict so much: NATO will
continue if its members continue to share undetermined common interests.9
As for NATO enlargement specifically, the problem of undefined state interests is still an
obstacle. And while the theory justifies U.S. belief that an institution such as NATO could affect
non-members’ interests in a way to qualify them for later membership, the emphasis on
economic-interdependence and sunk costs as the major reasons for institutional continuity
certainly seems to weaken neoliberalism’s explanatory power for why the U.S. would advocate
integrating a small country into NATO, for what is likely to be a higher economic cost.10
The theory is not of significant use in answering the puzzle of this study. As my
empirical history of NATO enlargement policy later shows, I believe there was a fundamental
and consistent interest driving U.S. policymakers on this issue that can be explained using a
different theoretical perspective, and therefore I rule out neoliberal institutionalism as a possible
explanation.

7

Robert Keohane, “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War,”
Neorealism and Neoliberalism The Contemporary Debate, ed. David Baldwin (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1993), 287.
8
Keohane (1993), “After the Cold War,” 273.
9
Ibid., 287.
10
Skalnes (1998), 69.
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The constructivist perspective on international relations views state behavior and
interactions through the lens of subjective identities. The focus on structural forces of anarchy, so
prominent in neorealism, is flipped on its head by the constructivist view that “anarchy is what
states make of it.”11 The focus for constructivism is on shared values and identities, not anarchy
or material interests. States do not have simply “a national interest”, but rather a variety of
relations and interests with other states that come about through social interaction, constructed by
the actors themselves – “states act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends
because enemies are threatening and friends are not.”12 From this perspective, socially
constructed interests give significance to the anarchical relations between states and distribution
of power among them, not the other way around as in the realist formulation.
For constructivists, institutions represent relatively stable sets of identities and interests.13
Even when they are formalized by rules, institutions still ultimately represent a cognitive
“collective knowledge,” such that when institutions persist constructivists expect the
fundamental reason to be because of shared common values. Importantly, this shared value need
not be cooperative – mutual recognition that two states are “enemies” represents a shared social
identity, and can form a “self-help” or “competitive” institutional relationship.14 State
relationships, most importantly for this study, can also be “cooperative,” in which states identify
positively with one another so that the security of each is perceived, to a certain degree, as the
responsibility of the entire collective. Depending on how well developed these collective and

11

Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power
Politics,” International Organization, 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp 391-425.
12
Wendt (1992), 397.
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Ibid., 399.
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Ibid., 399-400.
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cooperative identities are, security institutions can range from the limited joint action all the way
to the “full blown form seen in ‘cooperative security’ arrangements.”15
The constructivist focus on shared meanings makes collective action through institutions
less dependent on the presence of active threats, and also helps restructure conceptions of state
objectives in terms of shared norms rather than relative power.16 The constructivist answer on
whether NATO would continue at all after the disappearance of the Soviet threat is essentially
the same as the neoliberal answer: perhaps it won’t, but certainly it will if allies “have reasons
independent of that threat for identifying their security with one another.”17 But through its
insistence on identities independent of power gains, constructivism offers a more specific answer
than previous theories: NATO continued after the Cold War because of the allies’ shared values
of democracy, markets, and liberal principles of sovereignty.
NATO enlargement specifically can be viewed as an attempt to further the
institutionalization of these shared meanings to so-called “bad apples,” states that do not share
them yet – a social process that constructivism accounts for far more effectively than either
previous IR theory.18 The multitude of values-based argument for enlargement that U.S.
policymakers offered confirms this perspective as a viable one.19 For these reasons,
constructivism appears highly consistent with U.S. policy to expand NATO after the Cold War,
and it receives a more detailed testing in the empirical history of enlargement later on.
Constructivism predicts that a state is granted NATO membership “if it reliably shares
the liberal values and multilateralist norms of the Western community…[and if] the faster it

15

Ibid., 400-401.
Ibid., 401.
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Ibid., 408.
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Ibid., 409.
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Schimmelfennig (1998), 223-225.
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internalizes these values and norms, the earlier it becomes a member.”20 Later I conclude that
although constructivism is highly useful, this prediction does not offer a theoretically satisfying
explanation for why the U.S. chose the specific states it did through each round of enlargement,
and why others were left out.

Competing U.S. Strategies
An alternative method for explaining U.S. policy on NATO enlargement is to focus in
specifically on perspectives on American grand strategy. These perspectives focus more on
competing foreign policy coalitions in the domestic debate, in contrast to the IR theory
explanations of state behavior that treat states as unitary actors. The competing strategy
perspectives that I use here are based on Barry Posen and Andrew Ross’ influential 1996 article
“Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy.”21 The authors posit four different major security
strategies that are present in the American public debate after the Cold War. They do so by
summarizing strategies’ respective views on the main purpose of U.S. security policy, the
fragility and tractability of the international environment, the preferred policy means, and a host
of relevant, specific policy questions.22
The first strategy, neo-isolationism, has the narrowest view of American interests abroad.
With the end of the Cold War this strategy argues for a pullback of American international
activity. It argues that “the United States is not responsible for, and cannot afford the costs of,
maintaining world order;” the very attempts at such a mission endanger our security at home.23

20

Ibid., 216.
Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,”
International Security, 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 5-53.
22
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Ibid., 13.
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Terrorist attacks and great power conflicts would not occur if the U.S. did not meddle militarily
abroad. Most importantly for this study, neo-isolationism calls for an abandonment of the NATO
alliance, not its enlargement.24 The isolationist perspective is clearly inconsistent with historical
developments and thus need not be considered further.
Selective engagement focuses on what its advocates see as the greatest threat to
American security: a war between big, industrial countries. Because the U.S. has historically
found it necessary to involve itself in great power wars, and because these conflicts are presumed
to be the most likely scenario of large-scale uses of force, U.S. security policy must center its
attention on balancing powerful nations such that major conflicts never break out. Interstate
conflicts, and explicitly not intrastate or ethnic conflicts, are the vital sources of insecurity that
America need attend to. Interventions that are not in the interest of preventing great power wars
only use up precious domestic political capital that may later be lacking when a true conflict
needs attention. This entails a regional focus, specifically on Europe, East Asia, and the Middle
East – areas that include great powers and/or contain specific regional characteristics that could
serve to spark a great power war, as with oil in the Middle East. Finally, advocates of selective
engagement advocates favor the Cold War status quo in NATO policy. NATO should continue
to act as a collective defense alliance for its current members, ensuring stability only in that
region. All NATO enlargement would serve to do, from this perspective, is exacerbate tensions
with Russia and China.25 Once again, I rule out selective engagement here and do not test it
further in my empirical examination.

24
25
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Cooperative security argues for the broadest conception of American national security
interests, and entails the biggest mission in terms of scope and resources.26 This strategy expands
selective engagement’s focus on interstate conflicts to include intrastate conflicts as well. The
position of the United States according to these advocates is one of high “strategic
interdependence”: wars in one place are likely to spread, the use of WMD will beget more use,
ethnic cleansing will beget more ethnic cleansing. In other words, it is in the direct interest of the
U.S. to root out numerous large and small conflicts that, if left to simmer, would draw American
military intervention at a later and more volatile time.27 Because a variety of conflicts threaten
American security, U.S. cooperative security policy should focus on strengthening regional and
global international institutions to both directly counter violent conflicts and to deter future ones.
International institutions are preferred because their geographic scope and multi-national military
capability offer the greatest chance of a credible deterrent to conflict. Additionally, military
action by international institutions inevitably has more legitimacy – and thus will cause less
global backlash – than unilateral or ad-hoc coalition military action.
A deep patchwork of global and regional international institutions, for cooperative
security advocates, would serve to foster cooperation in a variety of policy sectors where
democracies can reap mutual gains – “diplomatic, economic, and security arrangements” all have
a place.28 The ultimate goal is the creation of an international system that integrates Russia,
China, and other potential great power rivals, and therefore these institutions should not seek to
create new tensions either. For these reasons, the cooperative security strategy calls for an
enlarged and transformed (as in, Russia-friendly) NATO, to act as a major regional security

26
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institution promoting stability across the entire European continent as means towards
integration.29
Cooperative security is broadly consistent with a policy of enlarging NATO, and so I
discuss it later in my empirical history of enlargement. There, I show commonly cited advocates
of cooperative security were found to argue both for and against NATO enlargement, and
conclude that the perspective offers too broad a set of policy objectives to be the most
explanatory of NATO enlargement.
The final strategy, primacy, rests on the principle that a preponderance of U.S. power
internationally is the only path to eventual world peace.30 While primacy advocates agree with
selective engagement that great power wars are the biggest threat, they prefer to avoid this
possibility through the continued build-up of American military and economic power, not
through the selective balancing of powerful states. Present and future great powers, primacy
suggests, will be deterred from posing threats to the U.S. because the cost would be existentially
high, and other actors will welcome this particular form “benign hegemony” for its stability and
predictability. While committed to liberal principles like cooperative security, the primacy
strategy is more judicious with U.S. commitments because national autonomy of action needs to
always be maintained. International institutions can be useful if they promote a system of
international law, democracy, and markets that entrenches the current unipolar structure of global
power, or even “if the façade of multilateralism renders the rule of an extraordinary power more
palatable to ordinary powers.”31

29

Ibid., 24, 27.
Ibid., 32.
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Ibid., 34.
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The primacy strategy is highly consistent with the evidence of a U.S. push for NATO’s
post-Cold War relevancy, so as to preclude developments that may “undermine the role of
NATO, and therefore the role of the United States, in European security affairs.”32 Viewing
NATO enlargement as a hedge against Russian aggression, and a method of integrating Central
and Eastern European states into the security wing of Western institutions, the primacy
perspective appears broadly consistent with the history, and merits greater attention later in the
empirical section. There I will argue that, although consistent, primacy does not offer a sufficient
explanation for the process of NATO enlargement, either its speed or its particular progression.
Both cooperative security and primacy are each individually helpful in explaining NATO
enlargement policy, but for different administrations. A theoretical explanation that accounts for
the continuity of NATO enlargement policy throughout different presidencies, then, would seem
to have more explanatory power than either of these two competing strategy perspectives.

Republican Security Theory
The final perspective I will test is the republican security theory perspective, from Daniel
Deudney’s book Bounding Power.33 Deudney’s work shows how theorists in republican polities
– based on political liberty, popular sovereignty, and limited government constitutionalism –
have reacted to changing material contexts in the international system throughout history.34 In
clarifying the most important “problematiques” and solutions offered in this wide-ranging
historical debate, Deudney constructs a coherent “republican security theory” that attempts to
grapple with the basic and ever-present question of what “political arrangements are necessary
32

Ibid., 34.
Daniel Deudney, Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory From the Polis to the Global
Village (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007)
34
Deudney (2007), 2.

33
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for security.”35 Here I will discuss the central theoretical concepts of republican security theory:
violence interdependence, anarchy-interdependence, hierarchy-restraint, and cobinding through
interstate union. I will also touch on Deudney’s account of how these concepts relate to the
history of American security policy generally conceived.
Republican security theory posits only two possible restraints on the use of violence, or
solutions to insecurity: limits imposed by material contexts, both geographical and technological,
or limits imposed by socially constructed political structures.36 A key republican security insight
is that these two limits on insecurity are “interactive”: limitations imposed by material contexts
change over time, which in turn alters the kinds of political structures necessary to confront
insecurity that material limitations can no longer control.37 The oceans did not need governance
before technology made navies possible, just as nuclear arms control regimes were not necessary
until the creation of nuclear weapons. Historically, as new forms of destruction, transportation
and communication emerge, so too has the necessity for new types of political restraints.
Republican security theorists have focused most on one material variable, which
Deudney labels violence interdependence, simply his term for the basic capacity of actors to
commit violence upon one another.38 Measuring the degree of capabilities among actors based
only on empirical evaluations of geography and technology, violence interdependence has
“profound implications for security that are independent of the distribution (or balance) of
power” among the actors themselves.39 Looking back through history, the major implication for
security arises from the fact that violence interdependence has grown across both space and time,
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driven primarily by technological change.40 Because material and social-political restraints are
interactive, republican security theorists hold that these vast changes in violence interdependence
– from bows and arrows to nuclear weapons – have demanded the need for new and bigger forms
of political arrangements.
When a new generation of technology causes a shift in degree of violence
interdependence, a transformation occurs from “second anarchy,” where the levels of violence
are essentially tolerable, to “first anarchy,” where material changes in technology render the
existing forms of political authority insufficient for human survival.41 For example before the
Industrial Revolution, the European state system was competitive but in second anarchy. It was
only with the new capabilities of violence at the turn of the century that anarchy proved
intolerable – and unsurprisingly what followed were major world wars and attempts at creating
larger forms of political structures, first through domination than through institution building.42
This major claim about the relationship between anarchy and violence interdependence – “that
actors in first anarchies require substantive government for security, while actors in second
anarchies do not” – is one of the two pillars of republican security theory: the anarchyinterdependence problematique.43
While republican security theorists advocated the need for larger scales of governance to
match larger scales of violence, they also forwarded a core insight about the quality of new
governance: a hierarchical new government can be just as potent a source of insecurity as the
state of first anarchy it was meant to mitigate, because a centralization of unchecked power does

40
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42
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not provide “adequate restraint upon the application of violence to human bodies.”44 This major
claim about the similarity between anarchy and hierarchy – that both are intolerable to security
when unrestrained by material or political constraints – is the second pillar of republican security
theory: the hierarchy-restraint problematique.45
The anarchy-interdependence and hierarchy-restraint concepts essentially posit two
primary interests for theorists of republican security – survival, and the republican characteristics
of political liberty, popular sovereignty, and limited government. While these republican features
may have inherent moral value, it is important to note that republican security theorists were
most concerned with the practical, security-based value in these constraints on government. So
while these theorists see the need to extend the scope of government in order to mitigate anarchy,
they also insist on constraining that new power in order to avoid hierarchical arrangements and
illiberal concentrations of power. As Deudney puts it, republican security calls for negarchy, in
which anarchy and hierarchy are both negated through actors “authoritatively ordered by
relations of mutual restraint,” not by subordination or lack of authority.46 These mutual restraints
are republican in nature, and so the concept of negarchy is simply Deudney’s way of arguing that
republicanism has historically been a security arrangement, in addition to being a manifestation
of normative liberal values. The dual aversion to anarchy and hierarchy is what makes the set of
foreign policy concerns and practices “distinctive to republics.”47
Theorists in republics throughout history have advocated a particular strategy of
negarchy, cobinding, in which republics join together with other republics in various forms of

44
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union.48 Specifically, cobinding occurs through interstate unions that “entail the delegation of
specified authorities to international organs.”49
Republics have both strong incentives and strong capabilities to cobind for the sake of
security. The stronger incentives come from the republican sensitivity to hierarchical tendencies
in responding to first anarchy, a sensitivity that interstate unions alleviate because they “make
less necessary the centralization of authority, and thus less likely the deformation of domestic
republican forms.”50 If Republic A is highly violence-interdependent with Republic B, for
instance, both states will have a better chance of maintaining their domestic republican character
if they opt to share and restrain their combined power in an international institution – as an
expression of each state’s sovereignty, but also as a limitation on their autonomy internationally.
Cobinding is preferable to attempts at isolation or domination, both of which serve to
reinforce domestic hierarchy and potentially produce intolerable insecurity. Luckily republics
also have the greatest ability to cobind, because “the structure of such unions extends their
fundamental constitutional arrangements.”51 In other words a mutual fear of anarchy and
hierarchy is more likely to result in a mutual cooperation characterized by neither. For
contemporary international politics and republican security theory, common examples of
interstate unions are international arms control regimes or collective defense organizations.52
Now that the major theoretical components of republican security theory have been laid
out, it is important to highlight how they relate to the history of American security policy.
Deudney argues that the American founding itself was a republican alternative to the European
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system of hierarchical units operating in anarchy. As a decentralized federation of states, the
American system gave its members the size and security viability previously only available to
hierarchies, but within a distinctly republican form.53 The industrial and nuclear revolutions
catapulted violence interdependence to a continental and then global level, ensuring that
republican security theorists continued to inform foreign policy debates and the behavior of
republican governments during that time.54 For example, advocates of republican security theory
during the industrial revolution, most prominently H.G. Wells, predicted that material-contextual
changes and growing violence interdependence would force a union of Western liberal
democracies, particularly between a European Union and America.55
Most importantly for this study, republican security theory heavily informed American
policymakers during the 20th century. During the last century, a consensus in American security
policy emerged that started from the anarchy-interdependence rationale as it applied to Europe.
American security policy since World War I has, argues Deudney, assumed that “rising levels of
interdependence, especially of violence, produced by the industrial and nuclear revolutions have
made isolationism impossible and internationalism necessary for the survival of limited
government.”56 The heavy pivot in U.S. security policy towards “making the world safe for
democracy,” started by Woodrow Wilson, was aimed at both aggregating power between
republics in order to respond to external anarchy, and trying to influence states in the
international system into becoming republics.57 Alliances with other republics and the addition of
new republics avoided the need to bunker up into a garrison state or attempt to secure European
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sources of insecurity by unilateral force. Both strategies of isolation and domination would result
in the corruption of the U.S. republican character for the sake of security.58
The level of violence interdependence with Europe over the past century, from a U.S.
perspective, has necessitated “cobinding for the survival of the U.S. constitution.” This was the
core logic informing a variety of cooperative U.S. policies with European republics during the
20th century, resulting in a large web of interstate unions in many policy areas.59 As the
dominant military power in the NATO alliance, the U.S. has played a crucial role in European
unification for the sake of both U.S. homeland security and the security of European republics.60
Thus, the formation of NATO and its activity during the Cold War was heavily informed by
republican security, as it represents part of a union between Western liberal democracies under
American auspices that “clearly sits along the main axis of republican security theory.”61 In the
table below, I summarize the relevant republican security concepts and how they have generally
appeared in U.S. foreign policy:
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Table 1. Republican Security Theory Concepts
Violence interdependence: the capacity of actors to commit violence upon one another, determined by new spatial and
destructive material capabilities
Anarchy-interdependence: ungoverned spaces of anarchy require new forms of government when a worse degree of
violence interdependence is introduced
Hierarchy-restraint: insecurity can arise from centralization of power, just as much as from anarchy
Cobinding: interstate unions in which republics consolidate governing authority in an institution, but decentralize it
through the application of mutual constraints
Republican Security Theory Concepts in U.S. Foreign Policy:
• Anarchy-Interdependence: Decrease the instances of out of control violence and conflict because it is
necessary in a world of high violence interdependence
• Hierarchy-Restraint: Prevent the U.S. from becoming isolationist garrison state
• Hierarchy-Restraint: Prevent the U.S. from becoming hegemonic state
• Cobinding: Alliances with other republics
o eg, NATO
o requires protecting and encouraging republican governments internationally

It is important to note that republican security theory is a set of functionality, rather than
functionalist, arguments. It is made up of claims about which arrangements are best in meeting
some goal or purpose, rather than claiming that outcomes emerge because they met some goal or
purpose. The arguments of republican thinkers like Wells – providing the theoretical precursor to
American internationalism generally conceived – did “not maintain that a European and then a
global consolidation will happen, but that it must happen to achieve security.”62
It is my claim then that U.S. officials who crafted NATO enlargement policy were in
essence acting as republican-security theorists, like the functionality thinkers Deudney focuses
on in his writing. Of course it makes sense that policymakers would think in functionality terms,
but I am claiming that the consistent pattern in U.S. enlargement thinking over eighteen years –
that three administration’s worth of policymakers used the same republican-security rationales
and methods when it came to NATO enlargement – actually makes republican-security theory an
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effective explanation of U.S. support of NATO enlargement. By showing that the enlargement
policy emerged as a republican security initiative in practice, in other words, I will use
republican security theoretical concepts to offer theory-based justifications for why the U.S.
pursued the policy that it did. In the next section, I outline the general contours of republican
security theory’s relationship to NATO enlargement, and offer my empirical history of NATO
enlargement as evidence of that relationship.

II. The Republican Security Logic of NATO Enlargement
The Argument
My basic argument is that NATO enlargement, an American initiative, followed the
republican security agenda of American internationalism. It sought “to populate the international
system with republics and to abridge international anarchy” in Europe.63 As Deudney writes, this
agenda measures success “by the extent to which the United States is situated in a nonanarchical
international system populated by republican states.”64 Therefore U.S. policies that seek (a) to
expand the space in which the U.S. does not have to respond to major levels of violence, (b) to
increase the number of republican governments internationally, or (c) to contain violent conflict
in areas of weak governance, all aim to achieve republican security objectives.
The empirical section of this paper intends to show how these three general objectives are
embedded into the U.S. effort to enlarge NATO. The empirical section is a chronological history,
but republican security concepts appear and reappear over time. What follows is a broad
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discussion of the ways in which republican security concepts occur throughout the history of
NATO enlargement.
First, general republican security concepts in U.S. foreign policy (see Table 1) are shown
in a variety of quotations and arguments made by government officials in the two Bush and
Clinton administrations. I cite instances of the three Presidents and top policymakers outlining a
particular view of U.S. violence interdependence, as it existed after the Cold War. These remarks
focus mostly on the possibility of ethnic and nationalist violence in the now autonomous area of
former Soviet states, spilling over into Western Europe or escalating to an intolerable level of
destruction requiring a large-scale American response, as well as material analyses of weapons
and capabilities of destruction. In referencing this new source of violence interdependence, U.S.
policymakers are seen arguing that U.S. security would be better off if these new dangerous
areas of insecurity were mitigated or contained. They argue that preventing escalating conflict
and anarchy in these areas should be paramount in U.S. security policy. These examples
constitute evidence of the anarchy-interdependence rationale in NATO enlargement policy. The
hierarchy-restraint rationale appears in the history of NATO enlargement through administration
arguments about the undesirability of an isolationist or hegemonic foreign policy, in response to
this new source of anarchy-interdependence.
Next, the republican security concept of cobinding through interstate union is shown to
be central to U.S. policy on NATO after the Cold War. I argue that the U.S., in pushing for the
maintenance of NATO as the primary security actor in Europe, strengthened an interstate union
in which it could have influential say over what sources of insecurity most necessitated a
response, while still benefiting from the advantages of alliance over isolation and unilateralism.
This can be conceptualized in republican security as a strategy of cobinding that relies on a
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specifically-American view of violence interdependence, in that the U.S. desired the most say in
directing security policy in Europe.
In ensuring that NATO remained relevant in the nineties, U.S. officials also positioned
NATO as an important vehicle for cooperation with non-NATO members, particularly former
Soviet states in Eastern Europe and Russia. This is seen initially in the creation of the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) under the first Bush administration, and the Partnership
for Peace (PfP) and Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) programs launched in the early years of
Clinton’s first term. Both of these initiatives paved the way for NATO enlargement, acting as an
intermediate step towards new cobinding relationships with countries that later became NATO
members. I show how these programs aimed to guide the implementation of republican
constraints in non-NATO states – specifically civil-military relations and controls over defense
forces – as well as to add to NATO’s capability responding to acute instabilities outside of
NATO territories, or “out-of-area.” I claim these policies goals meant to contribute to the general
republican security objectives of influencing the number of states characterized by republican
government in the international system, and containing violent conflict in areas of weak
governance.
NATO enlargement itself was hinted at by the first Bush administration, announced and
implemented by the Clinton administration, and continued by the second Bush administration. I
show how the prospect of NATO membership was consistently used to increase the incentives
for republican constraints on new governments within European states (again in defense force
constraints and civil-military relations), to foster cooperative security practices among aspirant
members, and to boost the incentives for upgrading military capabilities and interoperability with
NATO forces. Through this use of membership as a carrot, I argue the prospect of NATO
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enlargement was meant to help each republican security objective – growing the space in which
the U.S. would not have to respond to large-scale violence, supporting the installation of new
republican governments internationally, and building capacity to contain violence in areas of
weak governance.
Finally, I claim the two actual rounds of NATO enlargement were motivated by
republican security objectives. Granting the collective defense guarantee to a new NATO
member was meant to protect the advances in democratic governance and military capability
achieved by that country, as a prerequisite to membership. By using the dual criteria of
“republican constraints” and “military capability,” each enlargement decision aimed to decrease
the likelihood that NATO would have to respond to conflicts within the new member state, and
to increase the capability of NATO to respond quickly and preemptively to conflicts outside of
the new member state. These twin benefits encapsulate what Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright described as ''the productive paradox at NATO's heart: By extending solemn security
guarantees, we actually reduce the chance that our troops will again be called to fight in
Europe.''65 NATO enlargement, I argue, intended to serve all three republican security objectives:
increase the space in which the U.S. need never respond to a major conflict, increase the number
of republican government populating the international system, and increase the ability of NATO
to respond to out-of-area conflicts. This organizational setup is summarized in the table below.
Following that is the empirical section tracing the history of U.S. policy on NATO enlargement.
Table 2. Republican Security Theory in NATO Enlargement
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Republican Security Objectives of NATO Enlargement:
• Extend the space in which the U.S. does not have to face major, violent conflicts
• Support and protect the emergence of new republican states internationally
• Mitigate violent conflicts in areas of weak governance
Evidence:
• Republican security concepts in U.S. and NATO statements and policies
• Republican security objectives of NATO enlargement in U.S. and NATO policy

Organization of the Enlargement History
Since 1990, NATO has had two complete rounds of enlargement. In 1997, Poland, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary were invited to join the alliance. Five years later, in 2002, seven
more states were invited into NATO – Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania,
and Bulgaria. In both instances, the decisions of American policymakers were the driving force
behind enlargement, and the following empirical section traces the motivations of these
policymakers and the choices they made regarding enlargement. Within the section, I hope to
show how U.S. policymakers were motivated by republican security theory.
The first Bush administration did not officially enlarge NATO, but made important
decisions that both paved the way for future enlargement and carried with them heavy republican
security influences. The push for NATO’s relevancy and primacy in Europe after the Cold War,
and the establishment of cooperative institutions between NATO and non-NATO members
focusing most on republican constraints on defense forces, are the two major policy decisions to
note in this administration. The former ensured the U.S. could most influence responses to acute
instances of anarchy-interdependence, yet still do so through interstate union rather than
unilateral force. The latter aimed to enhance the republican character of new states, and help
contribute to NATO’s ability to respond to out-of-area spaces of anarchy.
The Clinton administration committed the United States to lead on NATO enlargement,
and oversaw the first round that admitted three new members in 1997. There are three major
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Clinton policies that receive attention. First, the setup of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) in 1994 made the military cooperation between NATO and
non-NATO members operational, paving the way for enlargement but also, in itself, aiming to
influence the number of republican states internationally and add to NATO’s capability to
respond out-of-area. Next, the actual decision to push for NATO enlargement was driven by
analyses of violence interdependence, and aimed at extending the space in which the U.S. would
never have to respond to major conflicts. Using NATO membership as a carrot to motivate
reform in non-republican states was meant to increase the number of republican governments
internationally. Finally, the decisions on which members to admit into NATO in the first round
of enlargement are used to show the explanatory power of republican security theory relative to
the constructivist, realist, and primacy perspectives on enlargement.

Republican Security Theory in George H.W. Bush’s NATO Policy
During the last decade of the Cold War there was a growing feeling in the United States,
particularly in the Congress, that too much of the U.S. defense budget was going towards
maintaining a military presence in Europe, through NATO. As George H.W. Bush entered office,
there was political pressure to reduce American troop commitments and cajole European allies to
build up a “European pillar” of NATO. The fall of the Berlin Wall in May 1989 gave even more
ammunition to the advocates for a reduced troop presence. 66 During the next few years, a debate
grew among NATO allies over the future relevancy of the alliance in European security. The
debate focused most on future American leadership, an autonomous Western European defense
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arm pushed mainly by France and a newly unified Germany67, and other European security
organizations that included the Soviet Union and former Soviet territories.68 The Bush
administration pushed for a policy of NATO primacy among European security organizations
and a continued American leadership role in the alliance, in addition to dropping hints at the
future possibility of enlargement. Throughout, the administration followed republican security
logic.
The summer and fall of 1990, as it became clear that the Warsaw Pact would cease to
exist in any organized form, was the first period when NATO enlargement seemed like an actual
possibility. Around this time, officials in Washington began to consider enlargement as a followup to NATO-Warsaw relations that were signaled over the summer.69 Although President Bush
ruled out official membership in the near-term, he refused to rule it out forever, indicating that it
was Warsaw state preferences delaying considerations of membership.70
In analyzing potential security relationships between the U.S. and the increasingly
unpredictable nature of Warsaw Pact territories, Bush administration officials pushed NATO to
use the anarchy-interdependence rationale to define new policies. The NATO summit in London
in June 1990 resulted in a declaration of principles that justified the new “hand of friendship”
67
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offer to Warsaw states with the claim that “in the new Europe, the security of every state is
inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours.”71 The NATO communiqué released a few
months later after a meeting of defense ministers, including Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney,
described the new forms of violence interdependence since the Soviet demise as arising
“principally not from the likelihood of deliberate aggression…but rather as unforeseeable
consequences of instabilities that might emerge in a period of rapid and widespread political,
social and economic transformation,” specifically “from instability in East and Central
Europe.”72
During this same period, administration officials sought to make sure that Americans did
not grow too isolationist and wary about committing tax dollars abroad. Yet they also hoped that
security policies and the use of force in these new anarchic territories would continue to operate
through the successful republican union of NATO. In this way the hierarchy-restraint rationale
began to come through, as U.S. officials had to argue against the tendency to fall into only
“garrison state” defense spending, and simultaneously against the tendency to project U.S. power
unilaterally – both of which could corrupt American domestic forms in the long-term.
Right after the Berlin Wall fell Bush administration officials spurned isolationism and
immediately asserted that the U.S. was going to coordinate its defense posture, including any
force withdrawals, within NATO and not unilaterally. 73 Speaking with reporters after the
London summit in June 1990, President Bush pushed back against growing domestic concerns
over the fiscal cost of internationalism, saying that he felt a “U.S. force presence in Europe is
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stabilizing and very, very important,” and that he viewed it as his “responsibility to make clear to
the American taxpayer why it is in our interest to help keep the peace.”74 Months later when the
Gulf War was showing European allies that they still needed a robust U.S. presence to maintain
stability, American officials tried to use the example as a way to avoid similar hegemonic
projections of power in the future. As an American official said at the time, “we keep telling the
Europeans that we don’t want to act alone…we’d be happy if they did more.”75
As 1991 started, American officials had established their hierarchy-restraint preference
for no isolationism and no unilateral hegemony. A NATO ministerial meeting in Copenhagen,
taking place in June of 1991, was an important step forward for the transformative changes to the
alliance, pushed by the U.S. the previous summer in London. As European allies agreed to fund a
rapid-reaction force that could respond to new types of insecurities and spaces of anarchy, U.S.
officials had to make sure that this force remained under NATO auspices so as to not contribute
to the alliance’s decline and irrelevance.76 Such a development would box the U.S. out of
contributing heavily to security stability in and near Europe, and thus was unacceptable from an
American anarchy-interdependence perspective.
Accordingly, the NATO communiqué following the June ’91 Ministerial meeting stated
the need to “enhance the role and responsibility” of European allies; it also pointed out that
conflict in the Persian Gulf highlighted the need for NATO to develop out-of-area capabilities –
by showing that “in an interdependent world that is increasingly affected by technological
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advances” outside conflicts can have “direct security implications.”77 In his remarks at the
meeting, Secretary of State Jim Baker reiterated that one of America’s “key goals must be to
ensure that NATO remain the principal venue” for all policy debates involving the security of
alliance members.78 The genuine effort to push allies to spend more on defense and
peacekeeping forces within NATO represented a U.S. desire to maintain influence in European
security arrangements, but to lessen the already-heavy security burden that the U.S. felt during
the Cold War (an aversion to unilateral hegemonic preponderance). The hierarchy-restraint
aversion to isolationism and hegemony, because of fears regarding U.S. domestic forms, greatly
informed this U.S. push for continued NATO relevance.
The most important development from that June 1991 meeting, as it relates to this study,
was the stronger cooperative signals NATO sent to Central and Eastern European states. Again
emphasizing that NATO member “security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in
Europe,” NATO allies agreed that “the consolidation and preservation throughout the continent
of democratic societies…are therefore of direct and material concern.”79 This was a clear
indication that, at least theoretically, the U.S. would support NATO going out-of-area to ensure
the security of non-members.80 In August of 1991, a Pentagon working group drafted a detailed
scenario in which the U.S. and its NATO allies would come to the defense of a smaller Baltic
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country (Lithuania, in this case) and the Polish border, in the face of threat from an “expansionist
authoritarian government” in Moscow.81
Central to this initial outreach was, crucially, intensified contacts and “familiarization”
between NATO and non-NATO military and civilian leaders.82 This suggested that the most
urgent aspect of consolidating “democratic societies” was making sure that there were republican
constraints on the use of force in these new countries. This was a practice the Clinton
administration would embrace full stop with its enlargement policy. It is also a policy fully
informed by the republican security insight on the insecurity of hierarchical government, and the
solution of cobinding through republican restraint as the best means of security.
The collapse of the Soviet Union during the fall of 1991 renewed questions over NATO’s
future existence, all of which came to a head at a major NATO Summit in Rome attended by
President Bush himself, in early November 1991. For the first time in twenty-four years, the
alliance released a “New Strategic Concept” that built upon the signals sent the previous year
and a half. It was the most comprehensive statement of new violence interdependence that had
been offered yet by NATO allies. In defending its claim that “the new environment does not
change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring
validity,” the document highlighted instabilities in Central and Eastern Europe that “could
involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security
of the Alliance,” the dangers of “proliferation of weapons technologies…including weapons of
mass destruction,” and the continued existence of Soviet nuclear weapons.83
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With the alliance essentially backing the U.S. notions of violence and anarchyinterdependence, the Rome Summit also marked the success of Bush’s push for NATO primacy,
which was informed by an American need to balance violence interdependence with hierarchyrestraint’s need for cobinding. At the summit, even France and Germany made it clear to the U.S.
that its role as alliance leader, and the alliance’s primacy in European security, would not be
challenged.84
The Rome Summit also formalized the cooperation signaled in Copenhagen, with the
creation of a council in which former Warsaw and Soviet states could consult with NATO. In a
way this was related to U.S. support of NATO’s primacy, as it ensured that NATO cooperation
and future membership was more important and would outpace new memberships into the
European Union.85 Named the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991,
the council was most focused on installing republican constraints on domestic militaries. Though
Bush thought it too soon to offer formal NATO memberships at the Rome Summit, he touted a
key feature of the liaison program – helping former Warsaw Pact states “change their military
apparatus from a weapon of the state into a guardian of a free people.”86 In explicitly trying to
enhance the republican character of these non-NATO members, this new council represented the
first step in applying a hierarchy-restraint rationale and cobinding strategy as it applied
specifically to new countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The U.S. was trying to increase the
number of republican governments, capable of effective interstate unions, throughout Europe.
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As the Bush administration closed out its final year in office, the creation of the NACC
had put NATO enlargement squarely on the table. Administration officials took conflicting
positions, with some thinking it would provide the most stable security environment (Cheney,
Secretary of State Lawrence Eaglesburg) and others thinking instability in Russia meant
enlargement now was too soon (Baker, and President Bush).87 U.S. NATO ambassador William
Taft perhaps summed up the consensus administration position best on July 13, 1992, when he
said membership offers “could come within the next decade, perhaps soon,” but that the NACC
itself was not a step towards that membership.88
By the fall of 1992 and Bill Clinton’s election, the grounds of the debate were shifting:
NATO would retain its primacy, but now the question was to what extent NATO should
cooperate with its new expansive partner body, the NACC, and how quickly that cooperation
should outpace potential NATO memberships with safer, more republican states within the
council. Though the Bush administration did not enlarge NATO, the alliance’s future role was
fairly secure and enlargement was a policy question now forced upon the next administration.
Bush administration arguments for why NATO had to remain relevant and one day expand, and
why American leadership in the alliance was still necessary, were driven by anarchyinterdependence and hierarchy-restraint problematiques, and aimed to achieve republican
interstate unions.
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Anarchy-Interdependence and Hierarchy-Restraint in the Clinton Administration
Early in the Clinton administration, high-level foreign policy officials confirmed their
agreement with core republican security insights about U.S. security policy after the Cold War.
Starting with the President himself, only weeks after entering office Clinton made it clear that
violence interdependence in Europe was very strong and in need of cobinding. The fear of
escalating violence was apparent at a February 10th, 1993 town hall meeting in Detroit.
Answering a question about the conflict in Bosnia, Clinton responded that “we’ve got to try to
contain” conflicts like this – to avoid ethnic cleansing from becoming a valid principle at the end
of the Cold War, and because problems “could spread to other republics and nations near
there.”89 Clinton also mentioned that, because of the high likelihood of spreading conflicts in
Europe, it was “no accident that World War I started in this area.” In pushing for multilateral
efforts at peacekeeping, Clinton showed his support for the hierarchy-restraint aversion to
isolationism and hegemony, saying that while he did “not believe that the military of the United
States should get involved unilaterally there now,” the U.S. was going to take a “much more
aggressive position” and in doing so “we have to work with these other countries.”90
Secretary of State Warren Christopher also gave explicit support to republican security
concepts a month into the new administration, in a speech to NATO allies in Brussels on
February 26, 1993. Christopher’s anarchy-interdependence logic came through in his description
of the “new dangers” that have arisen since the Berlin Wall fell: “ethnic antagonisms and
splintering nations” spawning violence, and global threats of “arms proliferation, environmental
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degradation, and rapid population growth.” 91 All of these new dangers along with lessons from
the last “turbulent century,” according to Christopher, only further underscored a core truth “that
our security is indivisible and that our dreams and destiny are linked.” The hierarchy-restraint
logic of American multilateralism was also evident in Christopher’s claim that, despite the desire
of some Americans to withdrawal heavily from Europe, “America’s commitment to Europe’s
security is undiminished and unwavering” and that the best way for that commitment to take
form was through the “continuing need for NATO as a guarantor of collective defense…by a
thriving transatlantic partnership.”92 Finally, months later in June 1993, Christopher echoed the
anarchy-interdependence logic once again, calling the West’s failure to act in the Balkans
“missed opportunities” and hoping that allies “learn that we must work together earlier to help
prevent conflicts before they erupt.”93
Madeline Albright, future Secretary of State and an advocate of NATO enlargement,
encapsulated the entire republican security agenda for American internationalism in a speech she
gave in 1994 as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Albright spoke of the globe as “far
smaller now” than it was at the start of the century, specifically because of material-contextual
factors contributing to acute interdependence: “weapons cost less but can destroy more at further
range. Borders provide little protection…economies are interdependent. Populations…are highly
mobile. And images of heroism and horror are transmitted instantly and constantly to and from
every corner of the earth.” 94 In particular the degree of uncertainty and instability in former
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Soviet territories meant the possibility that “current conflicts spread” and “other regional powers
could be drawn in.” Albright’s belief in the hierarchy-restraint aversion to American isolationism
was also clear when she criticized “some in Congress who either would pull the plug altogether”
and “those who suggest that America’s challenges at home justify turning away from
responsibilities abroad.” Her aversion to hegemony’s corruption of domestic forms came through
in her claim that there were no more important issues than whether the U.S. will be “forced to
fight big wars because we failed to prevent small ones, or “will have to resume a military buildup
because of setbacks in Moscow or because nuclear weapons have fallen into the wrong hands.”95
Finally, as the earliest and most senior official who supported NATO enlargement,
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake also showed heavy republican security influences in his
foreign policy views. In an October 1993 speech that sought to define a grand vision for
Clinton’s foreign policy, Lake reiterated what Deudney calls the essential republican security
insight of Woodrow Wilson: “[Wilson] understood that our own security is shaped by the
character of foreign regimes,” and thus he understood that to survive international anarchy you
needed, above all, to install republics.96 Lake pointed to the measure of violence interdependence
when he argued that attempts at consolidating market democracies should be targeted at “places
where we have the strongest security concerns and where we can make the greatest
difference…with large economies, critical locations, nuclear weapons or the potential to generate
refugee flows into our own nation or into key friends and allies.” Perhaps in a nod to debate
within the administration over enlargement, Lake also said U.S. efforts “must be demand-driven
– they must focus on nations whose people are pushing for reform or have already secured it.”
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He pointed to countries in Central and Eastern Europe as a “clear example, given their proximity
to the great democratic powers of Western Europe.”97

The Choice to Enlarge and Republican Constraints on Violence
Seeing as how crucial administration officials offered republican security diagnoses and
solutions early on, it is no surprise that those logics carried through as the policy process for
NATO enlargement got underway. Christopher’s February 1993 speech, referenced above,
showed that Clinton policy on NATO started at pretty much the identical point as the Bush
administration had left it. The speech “essentially recycl[ed] ideas” pushed in 1991 and 1992
about the need to operationalize the NATO-NACC relationship for peacekeeping and out-of-area
missions.98 In this way Clinton’s NATO policy started with the republican security influences
discussed in the first Bush administration.
But that April, Clinton was struck by the desire of Central European leaders to join
NATO, and seemed to consider NATO enlargement from that point on. Along with another
Christopher speech to NATO allies in June calling for an official NATO summit in January
1994, the April incident got the ball rolling on an interagency workgroup that would construct a
comprehensive U.S. policy on the new NATO.99 This was the formal start of a debate within the
administration that would take six months to resolve. It focused on the extent to which NATO
should cooperate primarily with all European states that wanted to partner (though not
necessarily join), versus giving clear signals and guidance to those who wanted to join NATO on
a “fast-track.”
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In June 1993, it was fairly clear that Clinton supported enlargement sooner rather than
later. At the start of the interagency meetings, it was announced that Clinton and National
Security Advisor Anthony Lake both thought NATO expansion was good idea.100 When asked at
a June 17, 1993 press conference whether he thought NATO was dead because of its inaction in
Bosnia, Clinton retorted that “the clearest example I know to give you that NATO is not dead
was provided by the leaders of all the Eastern European countries” – the leaders Clinton had met
with earlier in April, all of whom “said their number one priority was to get into NATO.” 101
When the reporter continued to ask what enemy NATO would expand against, Clinton argued
for the material-contextual factor of violence interdependence as all that was necessary – that “all
kinds of possible problems” were worth protecting against, “from terrorism, from the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, from yet unforeseen developments in countries
around NATO.”102 Though it would be years before the policy was implemented, even this early
Clinton was arguing that the effect of the membership carrot for non-NATO states was a clear
example of why NATO should continue, and that the material-contextual conditions around the
world in themselves constituted a good enough reason to enlarge NATO in the future.
The interagency debate resulted in an eventual consensus on what Clinton would say at
the January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels. A lot of effort from the Pentagon’s end was
figuring out how to make the diplomatic links created by the NACC operational. The result was
officially rolled out during Clinton’s January trip to Europe: an American initiative called the
Partnership for Peace (PfP) that involved all NACC countries (including Russia) in new bilateral
relationships with NATO. The inclusiveness of the NACC was present, but the bilateral aspect
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made sure that NATO retained autonomous decision-making when it came to PfP matters. More
importantly, the structure of cooperation was geared towards self-differentiation, in which states
that wanted to prove themselves worthy of NATO security had the opportunity through more
active participation.103
The PfP certainly had its intellectual roots in NATO policy from the Bush
administration.104 It carried through the republican security roots as well, specifically in that the
means of self-differentiation were geared towards installing domestic republican constraints in
these new states. The view from the Pentagon was that “if any institutions had the power to block
reform in former communist states, it would be the militaries,” and that the PfP could prove
invaluable “if these militaries had incentives to cooperate with the West rather than oppose it.”105
The objectives of the PfP were most clearly linked to republican restraints on the domestic use of
force – transparency and democratic control of defense forces specifically – which came directly
from the hierarchy-restraint insight that severe state centralization of defense and military forces
is intolerable to security.106
In addition, the adoption of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) at the Brussels
summit added an instrumental element to participation in the PfP. Arising “from the changing
security situation in Europe and the emergence of smaller but diverse and unpredictable risks to
peace and stability,” the CJTF sought to establish interoperability between NATO and nonNATO members for the purpose of small, rapid reaction forces seeking to quell escalating
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conflicts or humanitarian disasters.107 The combined effect of the PfP and the CJTF was to
establish a behavior regime in which states that made the most progress militarily and politically
not only signaled themselves out for possible NATO membership, but simultaneously
contributed to capability of NATO military actions. In this way, the PfP and the CJTF were
geared towards the republican security objectives of installing the number of republican
governments internationally, and mitigating spaces of intense anarchy-interdependence through
out-of-area operations.
Without a concrete reason to self-differentiate it was unclear what exactly was supposed
to motivate states to participate heavily in the PfP. This is why U.S. policymakers also decided to
give a vague but clear nod to NATO enlargement during the January Brussels summit. At a press
conference with leaders of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, President Clinton insisted
that the PfP was not a “permanent holding room,” but rather that the cooperation program
“changes the entire NATO dialog so that now the question is no longer whether NATO will take
on new members but when and how.” 108 In one of his clearest statements infused with
republican security logic, Clinton argued that the U.S. commitment “derives from more than our
shared values and our admiration for your efforts. It also derives from our own security concerns.
Let me be absolutely clear: The security of your states is important to the security of the United
States.”109 Furthering this security over values logic, Clinton also defended the decision “not to
immediately issue security guarantees…without knowing in any way, shape, or form whether the
reciprocal obligations of NATO could be met by new members.”
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The confirmation of eventual NATO enlargement in January represented a partial victory
for those U.S. officials who were pushing for the fastest timeline for new memberships. These
policymakers were concerned that the PfP, if it seemed like the closest any state would get to
NATO security, would dampen the incentive for reform in new states. Unsurprisingly,
administration officials who most heavily pushed enlargement during 1993 and 1994 also
showed heavy republican security influences, especially in their desire to sharpen the incentives
for democratic controls over defense forces by dangling the carrot of NATO membership.
Stephen Flanagan, a policy planning staffer in the State Department who had also worked
for the Bush administration, was a major player in convincing Secretary Christopher to support a
nod to enlargement at the Brussels summit.110 He also had forwarded his idea for NATO
enlargement before Clinton had even taken office, and used republican security concepts to make
his case. In opposing analysts who argued for a containment (i.e. avoidance) of instability in
Central and Eastern Europe, Flanagan called such a policy “shortsighted, impracticable, and
morally indefensible” because, above all, it would be “difficult to insulate Western Europe form
these emerging instabilities.”111 In other words it was not the fundamental desire to spread
Western values that should guide enlargement, but rather the very simple fact that the West must
spread its values if it wanted to protection from inevitably spiraling and growing conflicts on its
borders – a clear nod to anarchy-interdependence. As an effort to respond to these growing
instabilities, Flanagan proposed a mix of democratic, geostrategic and political criteria that could
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guide the criteria for new membership, “offered on the basis of the degree to which a given
society had completed its transformation.”112
Although not part of the government, defense experts Ronald Asmus, F. Stephen
Larrabee, and Richard Kugler wrote a paper in the journal Foreign Affairs, entitled “Building a
New NATO,” that Warren Christopher claimed had an important influence on U.S. enlargement
policy.113 Again anarchy-interdependence played a large role in the analysis. The three analysts
argued that “unbalanced military forces and weapons inventories” in instable and conflict-filled
nations had left a situation in which actors were now “capable of inflicting immense violence on
the others.”114 The collapse of the Soviet Union caused “ideological mobilization alongside a
security vacuum” that greatly enhanced the risks of “spillover” and larger state conflicts, making
this new large zone of instability directly relevant to the security of NATO allies.115 The focus on
a clear, conditional criteria for membership – focusing on democratic norms, civil-military
controls, and minority rights – meant that “NATO can help solidify a zone of stability in Central
Europe without undue risk of embroiling NATO’s existing members in new ethnic of intraregional conflicts.”116
Other officials in the administration made similar arguments for the need to use the carrot
of NATO membership as a tool to, as Deudney’s formulation has it, “install republics” in the
international system.117 Specifically, it was clear by the time of PfP rollout that “the introduction
of civilian control of the military [would] most clearly be linked to the prospect of NATO
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membership” (emphasis added).118 Again, this desire to entrench republican constraints in new
territories striving to join NATO was directly informed by the republican security concept of
cobinding. As a solution to the problems of anarchy-interdependence and hierarchy-restraint,
interstate unions are only viable between republics, and thus require the republican security
objective of installing republican governments through the international system.
1994 consisted mainly of debates over the speed and clarity by which the administration
was going to pursue NATO enlargement. Within the Clinton administration, amid bureaucratic
changes favorable to enlargement advocates, officials like Richard Holbrooke and Anthony Lake
jumped on Clinton’s enlargement statements from the January 1994 Europe trip and the
President’s seeming embrace that June of timetables and membership criteria soon.119 By the end
of the year it was clear throughout the entire administration and to the public that the President
favored enlargement, and the questions that now remained were when to enlarge and what states
would be included.120 On December 1, 1994, Secretary of State Christopher announced in a
speech to NATO allies in Brussels that the U.S. now supported formal “internal deliberations on
expansion and, in 1995, to discuss with Partners the obligations and implications of
membership.”121 Though there was still much detail to be filled in on the “how” of enlargement,
specifics on the ways new members would integrate operationally with NATO – the civilmilitary relations, defense force constraints, and democratic practices highlighted in the PfP –
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had already made the broad outlines of “how” NATO would integrate quite clear.
While the administration was busy dealing with the fallout from the enlargement
announcement regarding the bilateral relationship with Russia, in addition to the worsening
situation in Bosnia, enlargement slowed but was not abandoned in 1995 and 1996. January 1995
began to see the emergence of the formal NATO-Russia council as a “parallel track” to
enlargement policy – as a way to ensure enlargement occurred soon without creating
irreconcilable riffs between the West and Russia.122 In June 1995, Russia was convinced to join
the Partnership for Peace, leaving an opening for the administration to push ahead with
enlargement.
Policy during 1995 solidified the republican security logic of NATO enlargement by
making central the incentives for democratic reforms. In August 1995 Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott published what amounted to the most up-to-date administration defense of NATO
enlargement. Talbott described a major requirement for potential members as “full civilian
control of the military… [that] armed forces must be professional, apolitical, and committed
to…defensive purposes alone.”123 This included, according to Talbott, “parliamentary oversight
of military affairs, and… civilians [in] senior defense positions.” Most importantly, Talbott
wrote future members must “remain fully and irreversibly committed to such structures and
principles.” It was in this consolidation of reform, followed by the NATO protection of these
reforms, that Talbott saw “an expanded NATO [as] likely to extend the area in which conflicts
like the one in the Balkans simply do not happen.”124 The republican security objectives of
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expanding the space in which major violent conflicts do not occur and installing more republican
governments internationally are clear here.
The “Study on NATO Enlargement” released in September 1995 finally set in stone the
republican security logic that U.S. policymakers had been pushing. The very first contribution of
enlargement, according to the study, was the “support of democratic reforms, including civilian
and democratic control over the military.”125 Also important was the increased “transparency in
defense planning and military budgets, thereby reducing the likelihood of instability that might
be engendered by an exclusively national approach to defense policies.”126 Unsurprisingly, the
touted benefits of enlargement closely mimicked the general criteria spelled out in the study for
accepting new members, which included heavy emphasis on the military activities of prospective
members.127 Both benefits and criteria were fully informed by the hierarchy-restraint concept
from republican security, which sees grave sources of insecurity in centralized and undemocratic
military practices, and aimed to install republican governments in Eastern Europe.
In addition, the Study on Enlargement “sought to leverage the lure of membership to
encourage the resolution of long-standing ethnic and border disputes,” making the resolution of
such issues an important factor in membership decisions.128 This aspect of the study was geared
towards the republican security objectives of expanding the space in which major conflicts don’t
occur because of NATO protection, and boosting NATO’s capability to respond to out-of-area
conflicts.
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Perhaps the most important part of the September 1995 study was what it didn’t do: there
was no explicit, rigid checklist of criteria for membership. The point was to ensure that NATO
would never be completely locked in to granting membership to a state that met all the
requirements in the study.129 The specific list of countries that were going to join NATO in its
first round of enlargement, then, would remain unclear until concrete invitations were handed
out. For the next year and a half, the administration would be fairly adamant on the importance
of not specifically naming the “who” aspect of enlargement. The reason given was that any
concrete list of who was going to join and who was not would only serve to dilute the very
mechanism of incentives that NATO enlargement was supposed to produce.130 If the PfP began
to look like the closest place most states would get to NATO, so the argument went, what was
the incentive for working harder and better at the PfP activities?
This combination of PfP and NATO membership as a carrot instigated a variety of
workshops and seminars focused most on defense and political reforms. A few years later, in
1997 alone, there were 63 different works on defense reform of civil-military relations held
through the PfP.131 Though the results of these programs are debatable, there is little doubt that
the intention of policymakers was to influence the number of republican governments populating
the international system, a clear objective of republican security theory.
The rest of 1995 and 1996 consisted mainly of reasons to delay the enlargement
decisions.132 Russian anger over enlargement, combined with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s
shaky reelection prospects forced Clinton to drag his feet on enlargement. The violence in
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Bosnia also served as a psychological block on enlargement, only lifted with the signing of the
Dayton Accords. Finally, by the fall of 1996, the U.S. was ready to push forward with
enlargement. The plan was to announce the invited members at the NATO Summit in Madrid in
the summer of 1997.

The Decision in Madrid
Based on the general criteria for NATO membership – laid out implicitly during the Bush
administration and the first two years of Clinton’s term, then explicitly in the 1995 Enlargement
Study – the only choice faced by U.S. policymakers in the spring of 1997 was whether to
recommend three or five countries for NATO enlargement. Poland, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia were the realistic possibilities.
From the view of U.S. policymakers, there were more advantages to a small enlargement,
at least generally. First, smaller enlargement would cause less tension in the bilateral U.S.Russian relationship by drawing out the eventual question of Baltic state NATO memberships, a
sore point in Moscow. It would also cost fewer U.S. dollars, making the necessary Senate
ratification more likely. Finally, such a small round could potentially act as a signal that
numerous rounds were coming in the future, which would act to keep the domestic reform
incentive strong. The general logic was given a name, coined by Ronald Asmus, now working
for the State Department: “Small is Beautiful, Plus Robust Open Door.”133
As the most advanced politically and militarily, plus the closest to Western Europe
geographically, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were the clear and obvious candidates.
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The real question was whether to include Slovenia and/or Romania in the first round of
enlargement. The majority of NATO members, led by France and Italy, supported a five state
first round.134
In June of 1997, only a month before the NATO summit in Madrid scheduled to
announce the invited countries, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced the U.S.
decision to NATO Defense Ministers in Brussels: the U.S. would support inviting only three new
countries in Madrid. Slovenia and Romania would have to wait for the next round of
enlargement. Already inclined to pursue a smaller enlargement, the Clinton administration
decided against including Romania in the first round because of its shortfall in political and
economic reforms.135 The President laid out the Romania rationale in an interview with European
journalists a few days before the Madrid summit – while the three invited members “have
already been through the ups and downs” politically and economically, Romanian reform had
only really taken hold for a year, and Clinton decided on the need to “give them a couple of years
to stabilize their democracy, to develop their economy.”136
Slovenia was a harder choice. There was fairly widespread agreement that Slovenia’s
political progress and socialization was clearly not reason to exclude it, as it was with Romania.
Even the Pentagon included Slovenia in their cost calculations for enlargement based on this
assumption. Additionally Slovenia offered the geostrategic advantage of contiguity with
Hungary, and Slovenia’s inclusion, it was argued, would set a great example for other former
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Yugoslavian states that there were in fact rewards to be reaped from the PfP process.137 But the
Slovenia military was very small, and its lack of military infrastructure, as well as the evident
Hungarian contribution to Bosnia peacekeeping without it, made the “contiguity to Hungary” for
argument less convincing.138 Administration officials confirmed that it was indeed the lack of
effective military capability that pushed Slovenia out of the first round.139
The choice to exclude Slovenia ultimately required instrumental calculations on the part
of the administration and NATO. Clinton, in defending the choice for a three-state enlargement
before the Madrid Summit, emphasized the military considerations for membership. The
President argued that NATO “is primarily a military alliance,” and that it was “quite important
on principle that we not admit anyone until we’re absolutely sure that their democracy is stable
and that they are militarily capable… We have to remember, this alliance is the most successful
alliance in history because it’s had military as well as political integrity.”140

Testing Perspectives on 1997 Enlargement
It is at this point that I return to the theoretical perspectives introduced at the beginning of
the paper. Here I will test the primacy perspective, the constructivist perspective, the specific
realist argument, and the cooperative security perspective against the history of NATO
enlargement. I also lay out how the republican security perspective on the membership criteria

137

Goldgeier (1999), 118-119. Schimmelfennig (1998), 220. Jonathan Eyal, “NATO's
Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision,” International Affairs 73, no. 4 (October 1997), 709-710.
138
Eyal “Anatomy of a Decision,” (1997), 709. Goldgeier (1999), 118-119. Brian Knowlton,
“Top General Defends U.S. Choices for NATO,” International Herald Tribune, June 17, 1997
139
Meyers, “U.S. Now at Odds,” New York Times, May 30, 1997. Shenon, “For Now, U.S.
Insists,” New York Times, June 13, 1997.
140
“Interview with European Television Journalists,” Public Papers of the President of the
United States, July 3, 1997.

51
used by U.S. policymakers leading up to Madrid reveals it to be the most explanatory perspective
on NATO enlargement.
Primacy is fairly consistent with U.S. NATO policy for the first half of the nineties. It
accurately predicts the effort by U.S. policymakers since the Cold War to work for the
maintenance of NATO’s preeminent role in Europe, as a way to ensure that U.S. power is still
felt throughout the continent. It also is consistent with the effort to integrate Central and Eastern
Europeans countries into the multilateral institutions of the West.141 Although advocates of
primacy argued for NATO enlargement as a kind of “neo-containment” aimed solely at the
Russians, it also seemed clear at the time that these same advocates saw very little actual, current
threat coming from Moscow.142 Combine that with the fact that primacy advocates wanted a
broader and more ambitious agenda for NATO enlargement than the administration was
following, and it seems the primacy perspective has a deeper explanation for NATO enlargement
than Russia: “the desire to anchor the U.S. in a diplomatic enterprise that will preserve and widen
its involvement in European and international affairs, simply because this is viewed as an
unalloyed good in its own right.”143 The primacy perspective, in other words, views enlargement
as a stalking horse, “nothing more than the adaptation of a politically familiar vehicle to the task
of preserving U.S. primacy.”144 As for a prediction, then, a primacy perspective expects that the
U.S. would support the largest and widest NATO enlargement that it could practically achieve.
It is at this point that I rule out the primacy perspective as the best explanation for U.S.
policy on NATO enlargement. Rather than a calculated attempt at spreading the preponderance
of U.S. power as far and wide as possible throughout Europe, enlargement policy was a much
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more cautious affair. If the Russians were not a real threat, as primacy advocates seemed to
argue, what was stopping the U.S. from immediately granting NATO memberships to the Baltic
states? That would only serve to further the scope and influence of U.S. power preponderance,
without the short-term risk of Russian intransigence. The primacy perspective would also not
predict the exclusion of Slovenia and Romania from NATO based on a detailed judgment of
those countries’ democratic reforms and military – if a country was that close to membership, a
primacy advocate would surely just admit it, and allow U.S. muscle to provide the protection as
the country caught up to NATO standards. With its “stalking horse” account of NATO
enlargement, primacy simply comes up short in explaining the cautious and instrumental-based
enlargement decisions by the Clinton administration.
Constructivism is also convincing on NATO enlargement policy up to this point. Unlike
other IR theories, the constructivist argument on enlargement would be directly contradicted by a
history in which NATO opted not to include countries that shared its values.145 The fact that
NATO opened its doors starting in 1994 and clearly put democratic norms and values forward as
general criteria by which to judge potential future members is precisely what a constructivist
perspective would predict. Furthermore, the “socialization” process built into enlargement policy
is highly consistent with constructivism – using NATO membership as “an incentive to further
pursue democratic reform and consolidation of the transformation of their domestic systems,”
and to spread the norms of multilateral international law.146 Regarding the actual decision of
what countries are allowed into NATO, constructivism also offers a useful prediction: the
countries that are fastest to internalize the values and norms shared by NATO allies are the
countries that join.
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However, although there is much to be said for a values-based reading of enlargement,
constructivism has a difficult time accounting for the instrumental rationales behind the decisions
made in the spring of 1997. Constructivism is not contradicted by the decision to leave out
Romania, since it was justified by a deficit of democratic reforms that represent the values-based
perspective of constructivism. Yet, because the liberalization and democratization record meant
“the exclusion of Slovenia [could not] be justified on the basis of insufficient socialization…the
constructivist explanation does not sufficiently account for the choice of new members.”147
Republican security theory does a better job of accounting for these instrumental
considerations. In this perspective, the primary objectives for an enlargement decision are the
extent to which a membership offer, right now, (a) decreases the likelihood that NATO will have
to respond to conflicts within the new member state, and (b) increases the ability of NATO to
respond quickly and preemptively to conflicts outside of the new member state. With these
objectives in mind, the criteria for a new NATO member are clearly seen as instrumental:
“adequate republican constraints” on the domestic government are required, and “adequate
military capability” is also required. In other words, the ideal outcome for NATO enlargement
policy is the situation of states throughout Europe that are characterized by republican
government and capable militaries. The tables below summarize the constructivist and
republican security perspectives on the 1997 enlargement:
Table 3. Constructivist Perspective on 1997 NATO Enlargement
“Enough” shared identities

“Not enough” shared identities

NATO offers membership
• Incorrectly predicts invitation to Slovenia

NATO does not offer membership
• Correctly predicts no invitation to Romania
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Table 4. Republican Security Perspective on 1997 NATO Enlargement
“Capable” military capacity

Lack of “capable” military

“Enough” republican constraints on
domestic military and government

NATO offers membership

Somewhat unlikely NATO offers
membership
• eg, Slovenia

“Not enough” republican
constraints on domestic military and
government

Highly unlikely NATO offers
membership
• eg, Romania

NATO does not offer membership

Admitting a state with too few republican constraints into NATO would increase the
likelihood that NATO would have to respond to a crisis within that state. If the new member
government is “too anarchical” it will not be able to quell insecurity by itself. If it were “too
hierarchical” then, as per the hierarchy-restraint logic, the government would create its own
sources of insecurity through the illiberal and concentrated use of power. This would create an
undesirable choice for NATO – fight against a NATO ally government, or allow the continued
hierarchical use of force that would undoubtedly, in the future, prove untenable from a security
perspective. In addition, it is unlikely that a government without republican practices or values
would contribute at all to NATO’s efforts to mitigate anarchy in other spaces, through out-ofarea operations. Here, the relatively short period of Romanian democratic reforms meant that
Romania did not yet meet U.S. requirements for “adequate republican constraints.” In this way
the decision to exclude Romania from the first enlargement round is consistent with a republican
security perspective.
Granting a NATO security guarantee to a state with too incapable a military, even if it
shares democratic values, would mean an increase in the likelihood that NATO is dragged into
security crises within the borders of the new member state. Rather than lock itself permanently
into protecting the militarily weak government, withholding NATO membership for the time
being does nothing to reduce NATO capability in responding to a necessary security crisis within
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the state, yet also avoids the possibility of overextending NATO forces for unnecessary security
problems because the new member state is too weak to respond (sapping NATO resources that
may be needed for acute insecurities in other areas). The added risk that NATO security could
spur weaker governments to start unnecessary conflicts (say, with Russia) also is not to be
ignored. Finally, it is clear that a new NATO member with inadequate military capacity offers
very little contribution to mitigating violence spaces of anarchy elsewhere.
Republican security theory is thus consistent with giving NATO memberships to Poland,
the Czech Republic, and Hungary. As the most contiguous with Western Europe, hypothetical
anarchic space would represent the highest level of anarchy-interdependence for NATO and the
U.S. No matter how stable or instable these are, it is still a worthy republican security goal to
make sure that they stay as stable as possible in the future. As the most advanced in republican
constraints and military capabilities, protecting the regimes in these three countries with NATO
security guarantees unquestionably decreases the likelihood of conflict in these states requiring
large NATO military adventures or U.S. isolation sometime down the road. Also, because they
are the most advanced democratically and capable militarily, these three new members can
provide help to NATO in going out-of-area
Note that the dual criteria of “adequate republican constraints” and “adequate military
capability” can be interactive: a more republican or democratic state is inherently less likely to
see sources of insecurity or conflicts spark up within their borders, thus lessening the salience of
a capable military. This means, no doubt, the “republican constraints” criterion is the more
important of the two. However, a threshold of military capability is still necessary in theory
regardless of republican character, because the future is unpredictable, capabilities of destruction
are high, and even a republican government cannot guarantee that it will not experience severe
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internal conflict in the future. NATO, in that case, would prefer the domestic government have
capabilities to contribute in controlling a crisis within its borders. Also, of course, NATO would
prefer a net-positive contribution to its out-of-area capabilities, though such a contribution is less
important.
With this in mind, then, the republican security perspective is consistent with a very close
but ultimately instrumental calculation to exclude Slovenia based on its weak military. Although
the republican character of Slovenia was not called into question – and to be sure Slovenia was
more likely than a stronger but less-republican state to join NATO – its lack of military
infrastructure could simply not ensure that NATO was not getting itself into a detrimental
relationship, where it would be locked in to managing violence in Slovenia all on its own. The
republican security criteria for NATO membership require a combination of republican character
and military capability – what the exact extent of each must be for membership changes from
state to state. Thus, while the republican security perspective cannot predict that Slovenia would
not join NATO in 1997, it does a much better job at explaining why Slovenia was not allowed
into NATO than other perspectives. Republican security theory provides the best theoretical
description of the decision making process, and the metrics used to make the enlargement
decisions.
The fact that Slovenia is so close to the Balkans would perhaps make it a more likely
candidate for a NATO enlargement based around violence interdependence, as the republican
security perspective posits. Yet the political fact was enlargement could not truly be on the table
until a relative peace in the Balkans had been achieved, and the Dayton Accords in 1995 was one
of the incidents that allowed enlargement to proceed at a faster pace later in 1997.148 By the time
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of the Slovenia decision, it was the case that measuring the stability of a potential new NATO
member – rather than the extent to which that new member could contribute to the mitigation of
international anarchy – was the bigger priority for NATO enlargement. In republican security
terms, enlargement policy was putting a bigger emphasis on the expansion of republican
governments than it was on the ability to mitigate out-of-area conflicts.
There is also a plausible realist argument to be made at this point: all this talk of violence
interdependence was merely a useful excuse for the U.S. to enlarge NATO towards Russian
borders, and NATO enlargement is just another instance of one state striving for relative gains
over a rival state. This realist perspective is not as convincing as republican security theory,
however. First, it relies on an exaggeration of how threatened U.S. policymakers actually were
by Russian imperialism in 1994. While its true that some U.S. officials used the argument that
enlargement could act as a long term hedge against renewed Russian aggression, these arguments
tended to be offered in domestic political settings, and the administration received the most
pressure politically from those who wanted to be hawkish on Russia.149 Actual U.S. policy was
of course far more cooperative with Russia than realists would expect. What is the realist
explanation, for instance, of all the NATO-Russian efforts at cooperation and the bilateral U.S.Russian arms control agreements that were enacted during this time? There isn’t an obvious
realist reason why NATO enlargement in particular was used to achieve relative gains over
Russia, while a host of other U.S. policies strived towards cooperation and absolute gains.
Additionally, as Henry Nau writes, “by realist logic, the countries to defend, because they are
most exposed to Russian aggression, are the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Belarus, not Poland,
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Hungary, and the Czech Republic.”150 This particular realist view would predict a “farthest first”
enlargement that at least included the Baltic states, instead of the incremental and republicanbased choices of the 1997 enlargement.
Finally, the cooperative security perspective is completely consistent with the entirety of
Clinton’s NATO enlargement policy. There is little doubt that U.S. policymakers expanded and
transformed NATO, as Posen and Ross write, in order to respond to imminent threats, deter those
who break the peace, and “to bring the practice of cooperative security to Eastern Europe, to
strengthen the web of diplomatic, economic, and security arrangements” in the region.151
The main issue with this perspective, however, is that its description of motives is far too
broad. To say that the U.S. enlarged an international institution in order to spread the practice of
cooperation is to say not much at all. The high level of “strategic interdependence” posited by
cooperative security advocates includes the material factor of violence interdependence, but does
not signal it out. Therefore, it is unclear why the U.S. would focus on security institutions, versus
economic institutions, or legal and political institutions. Cooperative security simply suggests far
too broad an agenda.
Consequently, there is some confusion as to whether a cooperative security advocate
would in fact support NATO enlargement at all, if that policy were seen as hampering other
cooperative security initiatives. Henry Nau, in his writing on foreign policy, argues
“internationalists,” his phrase for cooperative security advocates who favor arms control and
economic cooperation, “oppose NATO expansion by exaggerating the threat to Russian
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democracy, the adverse impact on liberal forces in Russia.”152 There is no reason, in other words,
that a cooperative security advocate would push for NATO enlargement at the expense of
relations with Russia.
Nau, Posen and Ross, then, are at a crossroads. Both recognize the existence of the
cooperative security camp in U.S. foreign policy, yet there is no agreement over the camp’s view
on NATO enlargement. Demonstrating the confusion, cooperative security advocates like Bill
Clinton and Madeline Albright supported NATO enlargement, while Democratic Senator Sam
Nunn, a fierce advocate for arms control and Russian cooperation, ended up opposing the
initiative for fear of its adverse impact on Russian politics.153
The republican security perspective puts the central focus on violence interdependence.
As a result, it better points to the specific U.S. motivation, using NATO enlargement to prevent
spiraling conflicts and arms proliferation throughout Europe, and to install republican
governments there in order to avoid these conflicts in the future. Because of the more acute
source of violence interdependence in the areas between Western Europe and Russia, rather than
from within Russia itself, a republican security perspective expects NATO enlargement to at
least move forward slowly even in the face of Russian unrest. Additionally, because the theory
points to the need to protect only the most consolidated of republican states with NATO security,
republican security offers an explanation for the pattern and incremental nature in the
enlargement process. There is no such explanation forthcoming from the cooperative security
perspective.
In short, while the cooperative security prospective offers a useful and clear description
of the strategy of the Clinton administration regarding institutions generally, it does not offer a
152
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sufficient description of the specific motivations put forth by U.S. policymakers as they chose to
expand NATO.

The End of the Clinton Administration
The rest of Clinton’s presidency, with regards to NATO, consisted mainly of solidifying
Senate ratification for enlargement during 1998, and dealing with the bombing campaign in
Kosovo during 1999. Yet there were also efforts to make sure that the next round of enlargement,
though not to be overseen by Clinton, did not get thrown off track. Starting with the Madrid
Declaration, issued in 1997 as NATO announced its first round of invitations, there was an
explicit reference to leaving NATO’s door open in order to not discourage aspirants excluded in
the first round.154
This effort to ensure the incentives for reform so crucial to the enlargement policy were
not diluted culminated in the spring of 1999. First, at a ceremony for the three new members at
the Truman Presidential Library in March, Secretary of State Albright insisted that the nations
joining NATO “are the first new members since the Cold War’s end, but they will not be the last.
For NATO enlargement is an event, not a process.”155 In her speech, Albright once again spelled
out the republican security objectives of enlargement. She described NATO enlargement as “a
sign that we have not grown complacent about protecting the security of our citizens” – a
security now characterized by threats that are “less predictable…from an aggressive regime, a
rampaging faction or a terrorist group…[from] weapons [that] will be more destructive at longer
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distances than ever before.”156 In response to this clear anarchy-interdependence reference,
Albright argued NATO enlargement sought expand the zone of peace and security throughout
Europe, “to do for Europe’s east what NATO has already helped to do for Europe’s west.
Steadily and systematically…erasing without replacing the line drawn in Europe.”157
The next month NATO held a summit in Washington to celebrate the 50th anniversary of
the alliance. Though the event was shrouded by the on-going bombing campaign in Kosovo,
there were important republican security measures taken up at the summit, including a
strengthening of the republican reform regime that the enlargement process had established. In
his address, President Clinton assured non-members that NATO was “remaining open to new
members from the Baltics to the Black Sea.”158
This promise was made concrete by the creation of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) –
a program setup to provide individual assistance and guidance to all countries wishing to join the
alliance. Through reports and a back and forth feedback process between allies and aspirant
members, the MAP program focused most on the defense/military field and “a defense planning
approach for aspirants.”159 Nine aspirant states – including the Baltics and the two states who just
missed membership the first time around, Romania and Slovenia – began individual MAP
programs. It is clear that the MAP setup was meant to strengthen the incentive and the
effectiveness of republican constraints on violence in these aspirant countries, making the
“assessment process more structured and rigorous” and drawing heavily from the lessons learned
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in the first enlargement round.160 At the same time, it was announced that no new rounds of
enlargement were to be considered until 2002. Combined with the MAP and the “open door”
statements, it seemed by the end of Clinton’s term that “although the decision to enlarge has
been postponed, on paper NATO remain[ed] firmly committed to expansion.”161
In the conclusion of his speech at the Washington Summit, President Clinton neatly
summed up the core republican security insight driving NATO enlargement:

“Almost 100 years ago, President Theodore Roosevelt said something that could well be
applied to a united Europe and to our united transatlantic Alliance today. Of America’s
coming of age in the world, he said, ‘We have no choice as to whether we will play a
great part in the world. That has been determined for us by fate, by the march of events.
The only question is whether we will play it well or ill.’”162

In his advocacy for the spread of a unified and democratic Europe, if only because America had
no other choice, Bill Clinton pursued a republican security policy in his leadership on NATO
enlargement.
***
The second Bush administration oversaw the largest round of NATO enlargement in
2002. I focus on the quick embrace by the Bush team of Clinton’s NATO enlargement policy, as
a way to show the continuity of republican security theory thinking between the two
presidencies. I then show how September 11th facilitated a wider round of enlargement then
expected, which placed a heavier emphasis on mitigating out-of-area anarchies while still
fulfilling the two core goals of NATO enlargement – extending the space in which the U.S. does
not have to fight major wars, and installing more republican governments in the international
system. Republican security theory, with its heavy focus on violence interdependence, is shown
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to provide a better explanation of post-9/11 enlargement decisions than other theoretical
perspectives. Finally, I end with an appraisal of the primacy and cooperative security
perspectives, arguing that the continuity of republican security theory throughout enlargement
policy suggests it is the superior perspective in looking at NATO enlargement.

The Embrace of NATO Enlargement in the Second Bush Administration
As they entered office Bush administration officials laid out a specific view of U.S.
security policy and republican security concepts, focusing most on anarchy-interdependence in a
new era of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In his first policy speech on NATO, given in
Virginia only three weeks into the administration, President Bush signaled his belief in the need
for an activist U.S. security policy due to highly mobile and destructive forms of technology.
Stating that “transatlantic security and stability is a vital American interest,” Bush proceeded to
described the “dangers of a new era” that did not dissipate with the Cold War, particularly “the
grave threat from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons” coming from less predictable and
more diverse actors.163 In arguing that the U.S. “must confront the threats” posed by weapons on
a missile or that come in a shipping container, Bush outlined his view of U.S. anarchyinterdependence.
Other officials shared this view, particularly Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
Upon entering office he initiated a review of U.S. strategic doctrine resulting in a major shift of
emphasis to “21st century hybrid threats, like mass destruction terrorism,” that thrived on the
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technologies of destruction so central to the concept of violence interdependence.164 Indeed, an
important aspect of the first months of the administration was trying to shape European
perceptions of what American officials saw as the real source of extreme violence
interdependence – reports even described Rumsfeld as “a modern-day Paul Revere, crisscrossing
the continent to warn of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the urgent need to
act.”165 This specifically American view of anarchy-interdependence would play an important
role in formulating NATO enlargement policy after the terrorist attacks on September 11th.
Continuing the republican security logic of his predecessors, Bush showed a clear
preference for keeping the U.S. involved in European security through NATO primacy. The
response to a proposed European Rapid Reaction Force (EERF), a European Union initiative of
60,000 troops meant for peacekeeping but autonomous from NATO, was the same as it always
was. The U.S. supported more European defense spending, but preferred it to be within and
complementary to NATO – “as long as it strengthens NATO, not weakens it,” in the words of
Secretary of State Colin Powell.166 Bush aides made it clear that they favored a strong NATO,
and began to consider the possibility of rescinding a campaign threat to pullout of U.S. troops
from Bosnia peacekeeping, as a way “to protect the American leadership role in NATO and
maintain NATO’s priority over the European Union.”167 The aversion to isolationism – from the
hierarchy-restraint rationale – was evident here.
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The EERF and its relation to NATO in terms of authority and autonomy primarily
occupied early meetings between Bush, Blair and German Chancellor Schroeder. In both
meetings Bush pushed for and received assurances that the EERF would operate only when
NATO chose not to, ensuring the primacy of NATO (and thus U.S.) decision-making.168 But
Washington also viewed the EERF as a way to bolster European defense spending that NATO
membership had yet to foster, showing the aversion to pure hegemonic and unilateral
preponderance.169 In favoring NATO primacy, U.S. policymakers once again pushed a vehicle
for cobinding (a republican security strategy) that would be most responsive to the specific U.S.
perception of violence interdependence – which was shifting towards the WMD-focus shown
above, and steadily away from European perceptions.170
The Bush administration took little time to endorse U.S. policy on NATO enlargement as
Clinton left it; consequently, all of the republican security objectives that the enlargement
process strived for continued into the Bush presidency. There were early signs of this continuity.
First, Secretary Powell, National Security Adviser (NSA) Condoleezza Rice, and Deputy NSA
Stephen Hadley were all members of the U.S. Committee on NATO, a nonprofit organization
formed in 1996 to support NATO enlargement and push for Senate ratification.171 Rice again
confirmed her support for an open NATO door to eastern European democracies in an article she

168

“The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom at
Camp David,” Public Papers of the President, February 23, 2001. “Joint Statement With
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder on a Transatlantic Vision for the 21st Century,” Public Papers of
the President, March 29, 2001.
169
Michael Gordon, “Armies of Europe Fail to Meet Goals, Sapping NATO,” New York Times,
June 7, 2001.
170
For example of diverging threat perceptions, see Marc Lacey, “Powell Fails to Persuade
Allies on Antimissile Plan,” New York Times, May 30, 2001.
171
Rebecca Moore (2007), 77.

66
wrote for Foreign Affairs in January 2000.172 During the 2000 campaign, Bush himself pledged
support for enlargement, though without filling in details of exactly who or when.173 Perhaps
most importantly, former Clinton official and Ambassador to Poland, Daniel Fried, was hired to
be Director for European and Eurasian Affairs on Bush’s National Security Council. As a strong
enlargement advocate during the Clinton years, this was an important early signal of Bush’s
enlargement policy.174
All this pointed to the inevitable. Despite some positions early on that caused rifts
between the U.S. and other NATO allies, once in office the Bush administration confirmed
support for NATO enlargement quite quickly. Powell, during his Senate confirmation hearings,
confirmed that the Bush administration would support NATO enlargement, but offered few
specifics.175 Only a month into the first term, Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair put out a
joint statement affirming their intention “to admit to [NATO’s] ranks European democracies
prepared to assume the responsibilities of membership.”176 In May 2001, the President responded
to a gathering of all the MAP countries by insisting “no country would be left out on grounds of
its history or place on the map,” an encouraging sign especially for Baltic states looking to join
NATO despite Russian resistance to the idea.177
The first major policy statements on enlargement came during Bush’s first Presidential
trip to Europe in June 2001. While many issues divided the U.S. and its NATO allies during this
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trip – ranging from the administration’s missile defense plan, to its hard-line on the EERF and
NATO primacy, plus other non-security issues like the environment – NATO enlargement
continued on a relatively smooth track.178 At a press conference with NATO Secretary General
Lord Robertson on June 13, 2001, Bush made it known that he believed “all European
democracies” that want to join NATO and meet its standards “should have the opportunity to do
so without red lines or outside veto.”179 He also confirmed that the U.S. government supported
the expansion of NATO specifically because the U.S. “understands not only the history of
NATO but the importance for NATO as we go down the road.”
Though the specific list of MAP states to be invited into NATO at the 2002 summit
remained murky, two days later Bush signaled U.S. support for a large expansion in his address
in Warsaw, Poland. In the speech, the President repeated Clinton’s words when he pointed to
democracies “from the Baltics to the Black Sea and all that lie in between” as those who deserve
the opportunity to join NATO, and argued that in planning the next enlargement NATO leaders
“should not calculate how little we can get away with but how much we can do to advance the
cause of freedom.”180 In addition to this clear sign that NATO would eventually include former
Soviet allies (Romania, Bulgaria) and former Soviet republics (the Baltic states of Estonia,
Lithuania, and Latvia), Bush also stated that “the Europe we are building must include Ukraine,”
directly pointing to the possibility of a major, non-MAP state joining NATO one day down the
road. NATO expansion, the President concluded, “has fulfilled NATO's promise, and that
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promise now leads eastward and southward, northward and onward.”181
The speech in Warsaw finally left no doubt that Bush would continue the republican
security objectives for NATO enlargement. The language of the speech, according to
administration officials, was consciously designed to deepen the incentives for republican reform
in MAP states, by flashing the possibility of a robust enlargement that would both come soon
and not be the last round.182 Unsurprisingly, former Clinton official and Bush NSC staffer Daniel
Fried took the lead in drafting the Warsaw speech, indicating the sincerity of the Bush
enlargement policy and its “Clintonesque” nature.183 The next day, after a seemingly successful
and pleasant meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, administration officials cheered the
fact that Bush had clearly signaled “one day that NATO was expanding – and this meant
everyone – and the next day it was all smiles with Putin.”184
After the European trip, it was quite clear that “for all the differences between the foreign
policies of the Bush administration and the Clinton administration, policy toward NATO
enlargement has been one area of significant continuity.”185 In only his first six months in office
President Bush decisively backed NATO enlargement, and begun the process of further
extending the space in which the U.S. would never have to fight major conflicts. In embracing
the MAP process, he continued the incentives for republican reforms that contributed to the
installation of republican governments internationally. Both goals were republican security in
nature, and both were to be achieved through the policy of robust NATO enlargement.
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9/11, the New Violence Interdependence, and 7 New NATO Members
The show of U.S. support for a big enlargement in June 2001 prompted consideration
within the administration over which states to support at the NATO Summit in Prague, scheduled
for November 2002. In between, of course, came the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001.
Within days of the attack, NATO for the first time in its history invoked Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty, in which allies pledged to defend any NATO member under attack. The U.S.
military operation in Afghanistan and other anti-terror issues meant enlargement was relegated to
the background of U.S.-NATO relations for the remainder of 2001.
Yet only a few months into 2002 the administration reaffirmed its support of
enlargement. By February it was generally accepted – especially in light of Putin and Russia’s
wave of cooperation following 9/11 – that the Baltic states, Slovakia, and Slovenia were going to
be invited to join NATO at the Prague summit, while Romania and Bulgaria were yet to receive
explicit support from Washington.186 In March Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas
Feith re-committed the U.S. to “an enlarged Alliance that conducts joint defense and operational
planning, promotes interoperability, and encourages realistic training exercises,” while in May
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Bush repeated his Warsaw language by pledging to lay foundations for “a Europe that is whole
and free and at peace” and Colin Powell said the U.S. remained hopeful for “a robust round of
enlargement at Prague.”187
Though U.S. support for NATO enlargement had not changed since 9/11, the perceptions
of the security environment clearly had. A variety of policy and rhetorical shifts coming from
Washington indicated a newly aggressive and preventive U.S. foreign policy that sought to wage
a “war on terror” and defeat the rogue regimes of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea that formed an
“axis of evil.” From a republican security perspective, the attacks on September 11th introduced a
whole new perception of U.S. violence interdependence, showing the extent to which capabilities
of destruction, communication, and transportation could all converge to exert acute insecurity on
American soil.188
For an administration already inclined to view acute anarchy-interdependence from
WMD and anarchic or hierarchic territories outside of Europe – rather than from spiraling ethnic
conflicts in Europe that was the focus of policymakers in the early nineties – September 11th
altered the way in which policymakers approached the NATO enlargement process in predictable
ways. According to a State Department official, the enlargement rationale from Bush’s June ’01
Warsaw still held after 9/11 – “we can’t assume that European history has stopped,” warned the
official - but the events of that day also made it clear that a Europe whole and free was
important but “no longer enough.”189
The Prague Summit now had a dual purpose for American officials. The question of new
memberships would be settled, yes. But perhaps more importantly, this was an opportunity to
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push onto NATO allies the U.S. view that WMD “present as much of an ‘existential threat’…as
the Warsaw Pact divisions” and that with the now extreme levels of violence interdependence,
“NATO needs to be ready for anything.”190 Towards that end, Bush officials flipped the agenda
of the meeting to focus first on military and security capabilities necessary in a post-September
11th world, and only second on the extension of new memberships. Furthermore, NATO
enlargement could now no longer be separated from this increased importance of capabilities.
Throughout 2002, leading up to the fall summit in Prague, administration officials used
the new “war on terror” paradigm to assess the criteria of states aspiring to become NATO
members. The Pentagon, despite general apathy towards NATO abilities, began a genuine
evaluation of the contributions aspirant members could provide to Washington’s new foreign
policy.191 Driving this process in particular was the perceived military and strategic benefits that
new NATO members Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary had recently provided, as well
as the realization that aspirant members were taking steps to appear more helpful to Washington
in its war on terrorism.192 Because the U.S. now viewed potential new members as providing “a
platform with which to project power,” in the words of U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas
Burns, these potential benefits also seemed to heighten the opportunity cost of a limited
enlargement in the eyes of U.S. policymakers.193
“Niche capabilities” became the new buzzword for enlargement criteria. U.S.
policymakers saw an opportunity to use NATO membership as a way to develop specific and
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useful military capabilities in new member states, depending on the relative strengthens and
weaknesses for each members.194 This focus on specialized, niche capabilities stemmed from the
dilemma the Pentagon faced in “squaring the need for military efficiency with the President’s
wish for inclusiveness” in his NATO enlargement policy statements.”195 By ensuring that each
new member could at least contribute something specifically useful in the new security
environment, U.S. policymakers could continue the intra-European benefits of NATO
enlargement while adding simultaneously to NATO’s out-of-area capabilities. NATO
Ambassador Nicholas Burns labeled this “the new, more modern argument for enlargement,”
that it provided NATO with new allies “with whom to fight and keep the peace in Europe and
beyond.”196
In May 2002, following the pattern of history during the Clinton years, a NATO-Russia
Joint Council once again exemplified Moscow’s cooperation and the lack of true risk in
admitting the former Soviet republics into NATO.197 By September 2002, the decision to invite
seven new members into NATO had been reached, the result of “a concerted push by the Bush
administration.”198 Seven out of the nine countries participating in the MAP program were to be
included – leaving out Albania and Macedonia.
The emphasis on domestic republican reforms – so central to republican security theory –
was still important to the decision-making. Being a MAP participant did not guarantee
membership, first of all, as the cases of Albania and Macedonia show. A certain level of
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adequate domestic governance was still required to join NATO. In addition, the inclusion of
Slovakia in the final seven was only confirmed after a parliamentary election there solidified
republican norms.199 Finally, the seven states invited to join NATO were still required to
continue participation in the MAP and to submit timetables for reform that acted as “a
mechanism for maintaining NATO’s leverage over the invitees for as long as possible.”200 It is
inaccurate to characterize this second, robust round of enlargement as driven solely by
geostrategic considerations. Thus, the 2002 enlargement certainly aimed towards the republican
security objectives of extending the space in Europe in which the U.S. would never have to fight
a major war, and of installing and protecting new republican governments.
That the size of enlargement initiated in Prague, however, was bigger than had been
expected before September 11 (even after Bush’s Warsaw speech) was born out by
administration thinking.201 There was undoubtedly a new emphasis on capabilities that had been
absent during the Clinton decisions on enlargement. As a senior U.S. official told The
Washington Post, "September 11 changed the way we looked at enlargement," in that U.S.
policymakers realized they needed “as many allies as we can get" to fight terrorism.202 Through
their participation in the war in Afghanistan and in other counter-terror measures, the seven new
members – including the states thought to lag most behind in terms of democratic reforms,
Bulgaria and Romania – displayed that they were worth integrating into NATO and receiving the
alliance’s protection.203 There is clear evidence, then, that the material-contextual environment
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and the new U.S. sense of violence interdependence heavily influenced the 2002 enlargement
decisions.
The broad inclusiveness of this second enlargement round led some to believe that it was
merely a way for the Bush administration, adamant about forming ad-hoc coalitions, to finally
relegate NATO to the status of political club, without strong alliance cohesion or major
capabilities. Bush administration officials deny this accusation.204 While deepest motivations are
difficult to judge, in terms of initiatives taken up at the Prague summit in November 2002 there
at least seemed to be a genuine effort to update and modernize NATO into an effective fighting
force. Though not formally tied to NATO enlargement policy, a bevy of policies and programs
were launched at the Prague Summit that sought to keep NATO relevant as a military alliance,
and upgrade its capabilities for fighting terrorism and other threats creating high
interdependence. These included a NATO Rapid Response Force, a Partnership Action Plan for
terrorism, and a new WMD initiative.205
The incentives for republican constraints on foreign governments was also strengthened
by the introduction of the Individual Partner Action Plan, which was designed to enhance
cooperation, specifically in the areas of military and democratic practices, between NATO and
states that either did not want to commence in the MAP program or were not yet ready. This was
deemed a particularly important outreach to Central Asian and Caucasus states that were more
strategically vital after September 11th.206 It also represents a continued effort to influence the
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installation of republican governments around the globe, an objective of republican security
theory.

Republican Security and the 2002 Enlargement Decision
The enlargement decisions leading up to the Prague summit were consistent with
republican security theory. In embracing practically all of what the Clinton administration left in
their enlargement policy, there is no doubt that the two core republican security objectives of
NATO enlargement were still prominent for Bush policymakers. NATO membership was
extended to the seven countries in 2002 with the notion that it would contribute to a unified and
more stable Europe, in which the United States would never again be forced to partake in major
conflicts. By applying the MAP requirements and insisting on their continuity even after
invitations had been issued, the objective of influencing and protecting emerging republican
regimes throughout the international system also remained a clear priority for NATO
enlargement policymakers.
September 11th, however, seemed to heighten the importance given to the last republican
security objective – mitigating areas of anarchy-interdependence outside of NATO territory. The
centrality of the material factor of violence interdependence is especially helpful here. As
Deudney writes, 9/11 renewed debate over the extent to which “deterrence was a way to
reconcile the anarchic state system with intense violence interdependence.”207 By suddenly
thrusting terrorism and WMDs from “speculative scenarios into primary security threats,” 9/11
essentially pushed the Bush administration towards “a far-reaching post deterrence doctrine,” of
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which preemptive attack and global power projection played central roles.208 In this way, the new
focus on niche capabilities of aspirant NATO members represented a logical response to the
intense levels of violence and anarchy-interdependence introduced into American consciousness
after 9/11. Higher degrees of violence interdependence will spur more policies that seek to
enlarge the space of republican constraints and mitigate the spaces of anarchy. A more robust
enlargement – which in essence is more and wider republican cobinding – is not only consistent
with republican security theory but also expected.
The new requirements for NATO membership – with a stronger emphasis on military
capabilities but not abandonment of the republican constraints criterion – represented a shift in
degree, not content, from the Clinton administration. The fact that U.S. officials felt the
“operating environment” was far more Western-oriented than it had been in 1997 suggests that
“republican constraints” need not necessarily have improved from where they were in 1997, just
maintained.209 And though the criterion of “republican constraints” was still important (as
evidenced by the Romania and Bulgaria membership decisions coming last), there was a new
value placed on the “capable military” criterion. The republican security perspective on this
round of NATO enlargement is summarized in the table below:

Table 5. Republican Security Perspective on 2002 NATO Enlargement
“Capable” military capacity

Lack of “capable” military

“Enough” republican constraints on
domestic military and government

NATO offers membership

Indeterminate, but likely membership
offer
• eg, Slovenia, Baltics

“Not enough” republican
constraints on domestic military and
government

Indeterminate, but possible
membership offer
• eg, Romania, Bulgaria

NATO does not offer membership
• eg, Albania

208
209
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The constructivist perspective would clearly have a more difficult timing grappling with the
decisions made in 2002. While a constructivist hypothesis on enlargement predicted one more
NATO member in 1997 because of its tunnel-focus on “shared values,” the perspective misses
the mark by predicting fewer invitations to NATO in 2002. Romania and Bulgaria in particular,
with their lackluster political and democratic records, would probably not fit into a constructivist
prediction for NATO enlargement. The clear new emphasis on the niche capabilities and
strategic value of aspirant members falls outside the constructivist paradigm of values and norms
as the sole metric for enlargement decisions.
The specific realist argument that NATO enlargement is just another example of states
acting towards relative power gains – in that the policy represented a power grab by the U.S
intrusion into Russian spheres of influence – does not seem particularly convincing once again.
Though here the realist argument holds far more water than in 1997, essentially because this
round of enlargement included the Baltic states, the history does not bear out the realist analysis
of security policies being solely for the purpose of relative gains over other states. The laser
focus on terrorism and WMD after September 11th, the subsequent Russian cooperation, and the
appraisal of NATO members’ in terms of their domestic character and added value to NATO
out-of-area operations all do not suggest that U.S. policymakers were most concerned with using
NATO enlargement as a means to keep down the Russians. While there may be long-term
advantages should Russia ever turn severely expansionist, this was not the primary concern nor
central motivation of U.S. policymakers.
Finally, the primacy perspective is consistent with the Bush policy on NATO
enlargement. In the wake of September 11th, there is no doubt that the U.S. was using
enlargement as a means to project the scope and capacity of American and NATO military
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power. That said, the cooperative security motivation of NATO enlargement was less present as
compared to the Clinton administration. It is safe to say, looking at other policies pursued by the
Bush administration, that policymakers were not embarking on a bold mission to create a global
network of overlapping international institutions that would eventually serve to deter major
threats to security and foster widespread international cooperation. While the primacy
perspective is not useful under Clinton but useful under Bush, the cooperative security
perspective is useful for Clinton and not particularly for Bush.
Republican security theory offers a consistent perspective on NATO enlargement across
both administrations. Unsurprisingly, perspectives that focus in on particular kinds of U.S. grand
strategy inevitably shift in their explanatory power as new administrations come into office. This
is not a flaw with the perspectives, only an inherent limitation. Hence I would argue, through its
consistency and applicability over time, that republican security theory offers a better
explanation for the significant continuity in NATO enlargement policy. The republican security
concepts of anarchy-interdependence, hierarchy-restraint, and cobinding through interstate union
are all highly visible in arguments from the Clinton and two Bush administrations. NATO
enlargement throughout that time was consistently geared towards expanding the space in which
the U.S. would not have to face major conflicts, increasing the number of republican
governments internationally, and confronting dangerous spaces of weak governance out-of-area.

***
It wasn’t until April 2008 that the next round of NATO enlargement was confirmed. This
round, likely coming at the alliance’s 60th anniversary in April 2009, will only include the two
long-serving MAP states, Albania and Croatia. In the six years since the 2002 enlargement
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decision, however, there were a handful of enlargement-related policies worth noting that
contributed to the republican security objectives of NATO enlargement.
The Bush administration continued to set its sights on areas of acute anarchyinterdependence, specifically the greater Middle East. Using the Prague summit as a jumping off
point, U.S. policymakers urged a broadening in scope and mission of NATO activities,
especially in its outreach and activity in the Middle East. 210 U.S. Ambassador to NATO
Nicholas Burns justified the broader scope with anarchy-interdependence rationales, arguing “in
an era of globalized threats, no matter where we are in the world, we live downstream, because
what happens in one region of the world affects the rest of the world.”211 While Iraq and
Afghanistan focused the outreach, U.S. arguments relied on the violence interdependence felt
from those regions – in areas of extreme anarchy that allows for terrorist safe havens, and in
areas of extreme hierarchy that allow for rouge regimes and proliferators. The republican
security concepts were still present in NATO, even if enlargement was not explicitly on the
agenda. As Rebecca Moore writes, “NATO’s outreach to the Middle East constitutes a shift, not
in the nature of NATO’s post-Cold War mission, but rather in the scope of its
vision…[stemming] ultimately from a recognition that, just as NATO had projected stability to
its east during the 1990s, it must now seek to project stability well beyond the Euro-Atlantic
area.”212
The U.S. also continued to be the main advocate for further NATO enlargement within
the alliance. The strategic value of Central Asia and the Caucasus in the wake of September 11th
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supplied the impetus for renewed NATO outreach to these areas.213 President Bush made the
U.S. position on further enlargement clear in April 2008, when he strongly pushed for invitations
to Georgia and the Ukraine. Though NATO promised eventual membership to these countries,
the allies could not come to an agreement on a timetable or a MAP for either country, with
particular resistance coming from Germany due to worries over Russian relations.214 The result
was a compromise holding off any concrete plans, but pledging a return to the issue in December
2008.
After the Russian conflict in Georgia in August 2008 and the deep divisions in Ukrainian
government, it seemed even less likely that MAPs for these two countries would be forthcoming.
However, in one last-ditch attempt, the Bush administration strongly pushed for NATO offers to
both of these countries starting in November 2008 and advocated bypassing the MAP process all
together.215 With only a month remaining in the Bush administration, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice reached a compromise with NATO allies, whereby the U.S. would support
renewed relations with the Russians in exchange for an accelerated process for Georgia and the
Ukraine. The NATO relations with these countries would continue in the NATO commissions
established in the nineties, rather than actual MAPs. The final decisions on whether and how
Georgia and Ukraine would eventually join NATO were left to the incoming Obama
administration.216

III. Conclusion
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This study does not attempt to evaluate the efficacy of U.S. policy on NATO
enlargement. I have sought only to highlight the articulated motives of U.S. policymakers, as
they look the lead on enlargement.
I argued that the U.S. policy on NATO enlargement since the end of the Cold War has
been most influenced by republican security theory. To make my argument, I tested perspectives
in international relations (particularly constructivism), and perspectives on U.S. strategy
(cooperative security and primacy), against the history of NATO enlargement and records and
statements of U.S. policymakers. I found that no perspective does as good a job as republican
security theory in explaining the objectives and decisions of U.S. policymakers as they sought to
enlarge NATO.
I showed how republican security theoretical concepts – anarchy-interdependence,
hierarchy-restraint, and cobinding through interstate union – all appeared in the statements and
arguments made by administration officials pushing for NATO enlargement. I also showed how
the policies of NATO enlargement pursued the three objectives of the republican security agenda
of American internationalism: expand the space in which the U.S. no longer faces the potential
of major, violent conflicts; strengthen the incentives for and protect the emergence of new
republican states in the international system; and contain the most instable and insecure areas of
weak governance outside of NATO territory. The Clinton and second Bush administrations in
particular, by utilizing the carrot of NATO membership to foster republican reforms and offering
NATO membership to those states that were democratically advanced and military capable,
sought to fulfill these republican security objectives.
As President Obama takes office, the republican security logic of NATO enlargement
still holds. From a republican security perspective, extreme levels of violence interdependence
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are here to stay; they are due to material facts on the ground. The need to govern more spaces of
anarchy through republican unions will continue to make NATO enlargement, whether this year
or in five years, a necessary priority. Here’s predicting that, consistent with republican security
theory, President Obama oversees the accession of additional states into NATO during his
presidency.
By viewing NATO enlargement as a republican security initiative, it becomes possible to
see it, in essence, as a security practice the United States has been implementing since it’s
founding. Deudney’s historical reconstruction of republican security theory suggests that the
roots go even further into the past than that. Through all of the political and ulterior motivations
thrown around in the NATO enlargement debate, nothing can shroud the fact that the United
States is now bound to protect the security of twenty-five other republics. NATO enlargement is
a continuation of the American founding, a union between small republics for the sake of
security, and a continuation of the American tradition of protecting republican governments
around the globe. NATO enlargement – whatever one’s opinion of its strategic value or its
efficacy – shows the United States doing what it has always done.
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